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1. Introduction 
 
Recent research on antidumping (AD) protection policies has revealed that the 
institutional structure surrounding the determination and administration of AD duties makes 
analysis of this form of trade policy quite interesting and complicated.  On the surface, AD duties 
are simple ad valorem tariffs, intended to reflect the extent to which the foreign firm was 
dumping in the export destination market.  The calculated degree of dumping (or dumping 
“margin”) is the difference between a “normal” or “fair” value for the product and the price it is 
charging in the export market, and there is a positive dumping margin any time the export price 
is below the “normal” value.  The U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) primarily uses the 
price charged by the foreign firm in its own market as the estimate of “normal” value in dumping 
calculations.  In addition, after an AD duty comes into place there is the potential for continuous 
recalculation of the AD duty over time in what are called administrative reviews.  These 
administrative reviews occur at the request of the foreign firm or other interested parties and, in 
fact, the majority of U.S. AD duties are reviewed at least once subsequent to a case.  The method 
of AD duty calculation and administrative review process presents a foreign firm with a dynamic 
pricing problem that has not been explored before and will be the focus of this paper. 
While previous research has not considered this dynamic pricing problem, there have 
been important examinations of how the structure of AD investigations affects economic 
outcomes, including price determination.  Staiger and Wolak (1994) and Krupp and Pollard 
(1996) focus on how investigation “events” (i.e., the filing of the petition, public findings of the 
USDOC, terminations, etc.) affect import and pricing behavior by foreign firms.  Staiger and 
Wolak focus mainly on import volume and price changes during U.S. AD investigations filed 
from 1980-1986.  They find that changes in prices and import volumes during the investigation 
depend on whether the domestic industry has filed the case to merely harass the foreign firm 
(they call these domestic petitioners “process” filers) or to gain actual trade protection 
(“outcome” filers).  To the extent that they examine changes in variables after the investigation, 
they do not consider the administrative review process.  Krupp and Pollard use detailed data on 
chemical products subject to U.S. AD investigations to focus on changes in import volumes due 
to investigation events, as well as eventual AD duties.  DeVault (1996) examines data on the 
changes in U.S. AD duties from the administrative review process.  His empirical work uncovers 
factors that lead to lower AD duties over time, but he does not integrate these observations 
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within a formal theoretical framework.  Finally, Blonigen and Haynes (forthcoming) examine 
pass-through of exchange rates and AD duties to U.S. import prices for products involved in U.S. 
AD investigations.  They present a one-period model of pricing for a firm subject to an AD duty 
to motivate their empirical work, which finds that because of the way in which AD duties are 
recalculated in U.S. administrative reviews, pass-through of the AD duty is more than complete 
and exchange rate pass-through is substantially altered for their sample of Canadian steel 
products. 
This paper's contribution is to more seriously consider the dynamic pricing problem firms 
face in the presence of AD investigations and duties.  We first set up a formal theoretical model 
and then use data on AD duty changes from U.S. administrative reviews to test some of the 
model's implications.  In the model, a foreign firm is solving a dynamic optimization problem, 
where the current period price (p) affects the AD duty in the next period (T+1).1  Specifically, the 
lower the current period price is relative to the fair value of the product (pf), the higher the next 
period AD duty (T+1 = pf/p) will be.  Given that the foreign firm has a static incentive to dump its 
product (the static profit maximizing price is less than the fair value), the firm needs to balance 
the loss in the current period from setting price higher than its static optimal against the gains in 
the future discounted payoff from having a lower AD duty in the next period. 
Under certain enforcement of AD policy, the dynamic programming analysis yields a 
surprising result with respect to the optimal pricing path.  When a foreign firm dumps (setting its 
price lower than the fair value) in the initial period, then the firm will dump more over time 
(setting the price lower over time) until the price reaches a steady state value. Dumping duties 
will increase (or at least never decrease) through the review process!  Knowing how an increase 
in the AD duty affects the balance between the loss in the current profit and the gain in the future 
discounted profit associated with current pricing is the key to understanding this result.  In 
particular, when the AD duty increases, the rate of current-profit loss associated with pricing 
higher than the static optimal price increases, implying higher costs of reducing the dumping 
margin for a higher current AD duty.  Thus, once a firm dumps in the initial period free of any 
AD duty, the firm will face a steeper trade-off between the current profit loss and the future gain 
                                                          
1 Note that this (one-period) lag in adjusting the AD duty is crucial in raising the "dynamic" pricing issue. This is 
because instantaneous adjustment in the AD duty will simply set the consumer price as fixed at the "fair value", 
regardless of foreign firms' pricing (below the fair value), and, thus, eliminates the incentive to dump. As discussed 
in Section 2, it is reasonable to assume that there exist significant lags in adjusting AD duties, given the practices of 
AD policy.      
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with an AD duty being imposed in the next period, inducing the firm to choose a price that is at 
least as low as the initial price.  As the same process continues in the following periods, the 
foreign firm will lower its price over time toward a stationary equilibrium value, implying a 
rising AD duty through the review process.  This process may even lead to greater levels of 
dumping than when such policy is absent, thus AD policy with lagged administrative review 
process can perversely contribute to more aggressive dumping behaviors.2  Firms with high 
enough discount factors will follow this path of increasing dumping, whereas firms with 
relatively low discount factors will never dump, despite economic conditions that make dumping 
optimal in absence of the AD policy.  
While the benchmark case of certain AD enforcement is important for establishing basic 
features of our model, it is unlikely that enforcement of AD policy is certain.3   In our U.S. data 
of AD cases from 1980 through 1995, 41% of the AD cases were ruled affirmative, 48% 
negative and 11% were terminated because of a publicly-announced settlement (often a VER).  
In addition, while the benchmark case predicts rising AD duties over time after the initial AD 
duty is imposed, the data reveal that the majority of changes in AD duties during the 
administrative review process are declines, not increases. 
To analyze dynamic pricing behavior with uncertain AD enforcement, we modify the 
model so that foreign firms have ex ante expected probabilities of the possible AD case 
outcomes: Affirmative with AD duties, negative, or termination with a settlement such as a VER.  
With this uncertain enforcement, our analysis shows that the foreign firm may reduce the AD 
duty through the administrative review process (setting higher price over time once the firm 
needs to pay the dumping duties) when the probability of getting the initial AD duty is low 
enough. We can explain this result as follows.  As the probability of getting the initial AD duty 
becomes smaller, the foreign firm has an incentive to set its price closer to its static optimum.  If 
                                                          
2 Section 3.2 provides a numerical example of this case. Previous papers, including Anderson (1992;1993) and 
Blonigen and Ohno (1998), also show how the mere presence of AD policy can lead to greater levels of dumping 
than when AD policy is absent.  In contrast to these earlier studies, where strategic incentives for the foreign and 
domestic firms to use AD policy as means of achieving anti-competitive outcome drive this kind of dumping 
behavior, our analysis shows that the dynamic structure of AD policy itself may induce the foreign firms to 
excessive dumping over time even in the absence of any strategic incentives.   
3 One important exception, suggested by Robert Feenstra, was the Trigger Price Mechanism (TPM) adopted by the 
U.S. with respect to steel products in the late 1970’s.  Under the TPM, foreign firms automatically faced duties 
whenever their price fell below a trigger level, which fits our model of certain enforcement well.  The program was 
unsuccessful due to the problems of calculating trigger price adjustments due to exchange rate movements 
(Eichengreen and van den Ven, 1984), thus making it difficult to compare pricing behavior by firms under the TPM 
with our model’s predictions. 
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it finds itself subject to paying an AD duty despite its low probability, the initial dumping price 
can be lower than the stationary equilibrium price under certain enforcement (note that certain 
enforcement is assumed in the administrative review process).  Thus, the foreign firm will set its 
price higher over time until the price reaches the stationary value, implying reduction of AD 
duties through the review process.  We also show that when firms believe greater dumping will 
lead to greater benefits under a terminated/VER outcome (as in Anderson, 1992 and 1993) a high 
probability of a terminated/VER agreement will lead to AD duty reductions in the event that the 
firm receives an affirmative outcome.4 
The latter half of the paper tests the hypotheses from our model of dynamic pricing under 
uncertain AD enforcement that links the ex ante probabilities of case outcomes with the 
reduction in AD duties through the review process.  The empirical analysis adopts a two-step 
estimation method. We first estimate  determinants of the probabilities of AD case outcomes.  
We then use the parameter estimates to form ex ante outcome probabilities and estimate the 
effect of these ex ante probabilities on changes in AD duties in the administrative review process 
after the initial AD duty is imposed. Using a sample of all firm-product combinations subject to 
U.S. affirmative AD decisions and AD duties for cases filed between 1980 and 1995, the 
empirical results support the hypotheses.  Consistent with our theory, we find that a lower ex 
ante affirmative probability leads to significantly greater ex post reductions in the AD duty in the 
administrative review process.  We also find that a higher ex ante probability of TER leads to 
significantly greater ex post reduction in AD duties, which is consistent with Anderson’s 
(1992;1993) “domino dumping” phenomenon.       
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  The next section provides some relevant 
details of U.S. AD trade protection and the administrative review process.  Section 3 provides 
formal dynamic pricing models and our main propositions. Section 4 then describes our 
empirical analysis and a final section concludes. 
 
2. Salient Features of U.S. AD Law and Administration. 
 
This section provides a brief overview of the relevant details connected with U.S. AD 
investigations and administrative reviews.  The U.S. AD laws are administered by the USDOC 
                                                          
4 Anderson (1992;1993) shows that if an agreement after termination takes the form of a VER where more export 
licenses are given to a foreign firm with higher market share, then foreign firms will more aggressively dump to 
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and U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), each with distinct roles in the process.  
When an AD petition is filed, the USDOC determines whether the subject product is being sold 
at “less than fair value” in the United States.  In contrast, the USITC determines whether the 
relevant U.S. domestic industry has been materially injured, or is threatened with material injury, 
by reason of the imports subject to its investigation.  
The calculation of the dumping margin by the USDOC is usually not straightforward and 
revolves around how the USDOC measures what should be the “fair value” of the product sold in 
the United States. Selling a product in the United States at less than “fair value” is the definition 
of dumping and the difference between the U.S. price and “fair value” is the dumping margin.  In 
theory, the USDOC defines “fair value” as the exporting firm’s price for the same product in its 
own home market.  However, if the firm’s home market sales are deemed inadequate, then the 
USDOC may base “fair value” on the exporting firm’s prices in third country markets or on a 
constructed value for the product using manufacturing costs, selling, general and administrative 
costs, profits and packaging costs.  These calculations obviously involve highly detailed and 
confidential data on the transactions of the investigated firm, which are requested by USDOC 
from the investigated firm.  If the investigated firm does not comply sufficiently, the USDOC 
will turn to using the “best information available,” which is often information supplied by the 
U.S. firms that filed the petition. 
If an affirmative preliminary determination is made by both the USDOC and the USITC 
(which may take up to 160 days), then the importer must post a cash deposit, a bond or other 
security for each entry equal to the preliminary margin determined by the USDOC. This 
requirement stays in effect until either the USDOC or the USITC makes a negative final 
determination, which may take another 120 days.  If an affirmative final determination is made 
by both the USITC and USDOC, then USDOC issues an AD order to levy a duty equal to the 
estimated dumping margin on the subject product.   
When a subject foreign product enters the United States, the importer must pay Customs 
a cash deposit equal to the margin times the value of the subject product.  However, these cash 
deposits do not necessarily represent the final amount of duties to be assessed on the subject 
imports.  Rather, the margin determined in USDOC's final investigation is only used as a basis 
for estimating the duty liability of the importer.  The actual liability of the importer may be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
compete for market share. 
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determined in subsequent years by the USDOC.  Before 1984, this was accomplished by 
automatic yearly administrative reviews by the USDOC.  However, since 1984, such reviews 
have become voluntary; that is, unless an interested party requests a review, the duties assessed 
are those found in USDOC's final determination (or most recent administrative review).  An 
administrative review serves two purposes. First, it adjusts the margin on subject imports to 
reflect changes in the difference between the foreign firm’s U.S. price and the fair value so that 
the importer pays an adjusted cash deposit based on the reviewed margin until the next 
administrative review.  Second, it makes AD duties retroactive: If a review determines that the 
margin during the review period is different from the previous margin used as a basis for the 
importer's cash deposit, a bill (or refund) in the amount of the difference plus interest is assessed 
(or rebated).   
 
3. Model of Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of AD Policy. 
 
This section develops models of dynamic pricing of a foreign firm in the presence of AD 
policy described in the preceding section. We will first analyze the benchmark case where the 
AD policy is enforced with certainty and then analyze the case of uncertain AD enforcement.  
While we think the implications of the benchmark model may be unrealistic for the large part of 
pricing behavior we observe with respect to U.S. AD cases, it establishes a number of important 
features of the model that are important for understanding the case of uncertain AD enforcement.  
 
3.1. Benchmark Model: Certain AD Enforcement.  
We assume that a foreign firm may sell its products both in foreign and domestic markets 
and these markets are separated from each other so that price discrimination is possible across 
the markets. However, when the foreign firm chooses its export price in the domestic market, p, 
lower than its price in its own foreign market, pf, the foreign firm faces an AD duty, T (≥1) such 
that pT = pf in the domestic market.5 When the foreign firm changes p or pf, this AD duty is 
subject to change through administrative review process, according to pT = pf.   
                                                          
5 Once a product is subject to a AD duty, it is not the foreign exporter but the domestic importer who is supposed to 
pay the AD duty in practice, potentially creating a conflict of interests among them toward pricing decision, thus a 
dynamic game to be played between them. However, we do not analyze this issue in the following analysis, by 
assuming away the existence of the domestic importer who has autonomy in setting consumer price, or alternatively 
by assuming that the foreign exporter pursues joint profit maximization with the domestic importer.    
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As the initial dumping determination and the following administrative review are far 
from instantaneous to changes in the prices, the foreign firm faces a dynamic pricing problem. 
To analyze this problem, we use an infinite horizon model in which the consumers' tastes are the 
same in each period. For simplicity, we assume that the change in the AD duty lags one period to 
changes in the price, 1i
f
1ii p/pT −−=  where the subscripts i and i-1 denote period i and period i-1, 
respectively, with T0 = 1 (the initial period is free from dumping duties).  In addition, we set 
f
0
f
1i pp =−  (>0) for all i ≥ 1 in determining Ti, because there are compelling reasons and empirical 
evidence that the overwhelming part of the price change affecting the dumping duties in the 
review process occurs with the domestic (U.S.) price, not the foreign price.6     
Let c be the foreign firm's constant marginal production cost and q(pc) be its per-period 
domestic market demand function with pc (= p⋅T) representing the consumer price.7  Then, the 
discounted profit from the domestic market for the foreign firm in period k is given by  
 
(1) ( )∑∞
=
−++++ ⋅⋅−δ
0i
1ikikikik
i )p(Tpq)cp(  
 
where δ )1,0(∈  is the discount factor, 1ikf01ikik p/p)p(T −+−++ =  if f01ik pp0 ≤< −+ , 1)p(T 1ikik =−++  
if f01ik pp >−+ , and ∞=−++ )p(T 1ikik  if 0p 1ik =−+ , meaning that the imports will be prohibited 
from k+1 period on.8  
                                                          
6 As Gallaway et al. (pp. 219-220) discuss, the USDOC has wide discretion to disallow a foreign firm’s prices in its 
own market when determining “normal” value, either deeming them as “below cost”, or by finding insufficient sales 
and turning to a constructed cost measure or prices to a third market.  This makes the strategy of reducing the AD 
duty by lowering the price in the foreign market tenuous at best, and limited empirical evidence shows that foreign 
firms reduce AD duties primarily through increases in the price to the home market, not decreases in the foreign 
price. 
7 We do not analyze strategic interactions between firms in setting prices, focusing on how the structure of AD 
policy influences a foreign firm’s dynamic pricing (dumping) behavior in the domestic market. This simple demand 
function can be considered as an individual firm’s demand in a monopolistically competitive industry. One may 
pursue an alternative path toward modeling oligopoly firms and analyzing their dynamic pricing interactions in the 
presence of AD policy, but we do not pursue this avenue in this paper.         
8 As discussed earlier, the U.S. applies AD duties retroactively so that foreign firms pay estimated AD duties at the 
beginning of the period, and then when AD duties are re-estimated at the end of the period, they pay additional 
duties or receive a refund, depending on whether the AD duty increased or decreased over the period.  Denoting the 
refund duty rate for sales during period i by ir , with )pTp(r
f
0iii −⋅=  if f0i pp ≤  and )pTp(r f0if0i −⋅=  if f0i pp > , 
we can analyze the effect of introducing “retro-activeness” in the administrative review process by analyzing the 
following problem:  
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The dynamic pricing problem of the foreign firm would involve choosing the sequence of 
its foreign prices, as well as the sequence of its domestic prices.  To characterize the optimal 
sequence for the domestic prices, however, we can focus on the problem of maximizing the 
discounted profit from the domestic market by choosing the optimal domestic price sequence for 
a given f0p (optimally chosen in the initial period).  This is because only the initial foreign price 
will matter in determining all subsequent AD duties for the domestic market.  
Therefore, we analyze the following optimization problem, taking f0p  and ),0[p 1 ∞∈−  as 
given: 
(2) ( )  ..., 2, 1, 0, i ),,0[p  with )p(Tpq)cp(Sup i
0i
1iiii
i
0i}ip{
=∞∈⋅⋅−δ∑∞
=
−∞=
 
 
or, the corresponding dynamic programming problem: 
 
(3)  ( )[ ] )p(V)p(Tpq)cp(Sup)p(V 11
),0[p
δ+⋅⋅−= −− ∞∈  
 
under proper conditions that guarantee the equivalence between the above two problems. 
Denote the supremum function resulting from (2) by V*(p-1) and the value function 
satisfying (3) by V(p-1). Given the existence, uniqueness, and equivalence of V*(p-1) and V(p-1), 
we can describe the optimal pricing path of the foreign firm facing the AD policy by analyzing 
the optimal policy correspondence G: [0, ∞)→[0, ∞), defined by  
 
(4)  G(p-1) = ( ) } )p(V)p(Tpq)cp( )V(p:),0[p{ 11 δ+⋅⋅−=∞∈ −− . 
 
Lemma 1 specifies the conditions that enable such analysis. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
( )∑∞
=
−⋅⋅+−δ∞= 0i
1iiiii
i )p(Tpq]r)cp[(Sup
0i}ip{
. 
However, it can be shown that a model with this retroactive feature will generate qualitatively identical results with 
respect to the dynamic pricing behavior as the model without retro-activeness. From now on, thus, we will restrict 
our attention to the simpler model in (1). This basic model is also consistent with the structure of the EU's 
antidumping law, which lacks retro-activeness in its administrative review process. 
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Lemma 1. If q(pc) ≥ 0 is a bounded, continuous, and strictly decreasing (when q(pc) > 0)  
function in pc ≡ p⋅T ∈ [0,∞), and there exists a constant p  > 0 s.t q(pc) = 0 for all pc p≥ , 
then there exist unique solutions for (2) and (3), with V*(p-1) and V(p-1) being bounded, 
continuous, and identical functions to each other. G(p-1) is non-empty, compact-valued and 
upper-hemi continuous correspondence.  (See appendix for proof) 
 
Lemma 1 implies that we can use the dynamic programming problem (3) for almost any 
reasonable demand functions to analyze the problem (2).  For further characterization of G(p) 
and V(p), however, we need to introduce further constraints on q(pc): 
 
(A1)  [ ])p(q)cp(maxArg
P
−  < f0p : the foreign firm has an incentive to dump (p < f0p ) in the 
absence of AD policy. 
(A2)  q(pc) is twice differentiable.  
(A3) q( f0p ⋅( f0p /c)) > 0. 
(A4)  q(pc) is not too convex so that ∂2π(p;T)/∂p∂T = (∂q(pc)/∂pc)⋅p + (p − c)⋅[(∂q(pc)/∂pc) + 
(∂2q(pc)/∂pc2)⋅pc] < 0 for p > c, T ≤ f0p /c, and q(pc) > 0, where π(p;T) = (p − c)⋅q(p⋅T). 
 
(A1) simply requires the demand conditions to be relevant for our analysis of the foreign firm's 
dynamic pricing under AD policy. (A2) facilitates the analysis by enabling us to use 
differentiation.  (A3) is a sufficient condition for positive sales along the optimal pricing path, 
which largely simplifies the analysis without affecting the results.9,10  Finally, (A4) implies that 
the cost of setting a price higher than the static optimal price (p* satisfying ∂π(p=p*;T)/∂p = 0) is 
increasing as the AD duty increases and it plays a crucial role in the following characterization of 
the optimal pricing path.11 
                                                          
9 As discussed in Gallaway et al. (1999), most of U.S. AD duties have turned out to be non-prohibitive, providing a 
justification for this simplifying assumption. 
10  If a foreign firm chooses not to export its product to the U.S. market under a AD duty, then the AD duty will 
remain at the same level. This generates a pricing path where a current period state variable (the current dumping 
duty) may depend on the price choices made more than one period before, necessitating the use of a recursive 
method of non-conventional form to analyze the dynamic optimization problem. We can show that all the major 
results of the following analysis continue to be true under the possibility of a prohibitive AD duty, thus (A3) merely 
simplifies the analysis.     
11 q(pc) being a concave function (∂2q(pc)/∂pc2 ≤ 0) is a sufficient condition for (A4). (A4) is also a sufficient 
condition for the second order condition for maximizing π(p;T) with respective to p: ∂2π(p;T)/∂p2 =T⋅[ 2⋅(∂q(pc)/∂pc) 
+ (p − c)⋅T⋅(∂2q(pc)/∂pc2)] < 0. An alternative condition with ∂2π(p;T)/∂p∂T > 0, will imply a distinctively different 
and interesting pricing dynamics under AD policy, as discussed in footnote 12. However, the following analysis will 
focus on the case with (A4), because the empirical findings on the price dynamics largely support the hypotheses 
generated by the model with (A4) rather than the ones generated from assuming ∂2π(p;T)/∂p∂T > 0.              
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With (A1)-(A4), the following lemma provides sharper descriptions of V(p), as well as 
narrowing down the economically relevant domain and the image of G(p) on which we will 
focus our analysis. 
 
 
Lemma 2. V(p) is a strictly increasing function in p ∈ [c, f0p ). If the foreign firm chooses its 
initial price 0p  in the absence of AD duties (T0 = 1), then we can focus on the optimal 
pricing path where pi ∈ (c, f0p ] for i = 0, 1, 2, …, without loss of generality.  (See appendix 
for proof) 
 
It is easy to understand why V(p) is an increasing function because the AD duty will be 
lower with higher values for p (< f0p ), implying more favorable environment for the dynamic 
profit maximization.  The intuition for why the optimal pricing path is bounded between c and 
f
0p  is also relatively straightforward.  First, the firm would never want to set p ≤ c because it can 
raise the current period payoff to a positive value from a negative or zero one by setting p > c, 
and this will also raise the next period's discounted payoff by inducing a lower AD duty.  
Second, the firm would not want to price above f0p  in the initial period because, given (A1) and 
(A4) which guarantees the second order condition for the current period profit maximization 
problem hold, it will get a higher current period profit for setting p = f0p  than for any p > 
f
0p .  
Additionally, the next period AD duty will be zero for any p ≥ f0p  with a constant value for V(p).  
This superiority of setting p = f0p  over p > 
f
0p  will continue to be true as long as an increase in 
the current AD duty would not make the foreign firm's static optimal price (maximizing the 
current period profit) to be higher than f0p .  (A4) implies that the static optimal price will 
decrease as the current AD duty increases, eliminating the possibility for setting p > f0p  in the 
optimal pricing path. 
Based on Lemma 2, we will focus on the characterization of G(p) on p ∈ (c, f0p ]. Denote 
max{G(p)} by h(p) and min{G(p)} by l(p). Then, we can derive the following lemma.  
 
Lemma 3. The optimal correspondence G(p) is increasing in p in the sense that h(p'') ≤ l(p') 
for all p' > p'' ∈ (c, f0p ].  (See appendix for proof) 
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Lemma 3 implies that the foreign firm's optimal price in the current period does not 
increase when the current AD duty increases.  Figure 1 is helpful in understanding this result. 
Figure 1a depicts profit functions (π(p; T'), π(p; T'')) with different AD duties of the current 
period (T' < T''), and Figure 1b depicts the increasing value function as a function of the current 
period price (V(p)). By definition, setting p = l( f0p /T' = p') maximizes the current discounted 
payoff when the current AD duty is T'; π(l(p'); T') + δV(l(p')) ≥ π(p; T') + δV(p) for all p ∈ (c, 
f
0p ]. If the current period AD duty increases to T'', the profit function shifts down in such a way 
that ∂π(p; T')/∂p > ∂π(p; T'')/∂p for all p due to (A4). This shift in profit function in response to 
an increase in the AD duty makes setting the current period price higher than l(p') even less 
attractive than before. Note that the foreign firm tries to balance between the current period profit 
loss against the future discounted profit gain in setting the current price higher than its static 
optimum.  Because a higher current AD duty will raise the current period profit loss associated 
with higher prices, it induces the foreign firm to choose a lower current price than before, if not 
an equal price.   
Based on Lemma 1-3, we can now characterize the dynamic pricing behavior of the 
foreign firm in the presence of AD policy as follows:  
 
Proposition 1.  When q(pc) satisfies (A1)-(A4), there exist δc ∈ (0,1] such that  
i) for δ > δc, the foreign firm will set pi = f0p , thus Ti = 1 for i = 0, 1, 2, … . 
ii) for δ < δc, the foreign firm will set 0p  < f0p , thus T0 >1 with 0p  ≥ 1p  ≥ 2p  …, thus  
 T0≤ T1 ≤ T2 ≤ … .   (See appendix for proof) 
 
As mentioned earlier, the optimal price is set to balance the current period profit loss 
against the discounted profit gain in the next period.  Therefore, we will observe the foreign firm 
dumping its products only when the foreign firm values the current period profit high enough 
relative to its future discounted profit (δ < δc).  If the foreign firm dumps in the initial period, 
then rather surprisingly the foreign firm will never try to reduce its dumping margin through the 
administrative review process, according to Proposition 1.   
This is shown in Figure 2a, which depicts possible optimal policy correspondences for 
firms with δ < δc and those with δ > δc.  Focusing on G(p;δ < δc), suppose we begin with no AD 
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duty, thus having p (the last period price) being f0p .  Then, its current period optimal price is 
given by the policy correspondence, G(p = f0p ;δ < δc), which is represented by the vertical height 
at point A.  This price is clearly less than f0p  because it is below the 45° line.  In fact, by 
translating it to the 45° line at point B, we can see it corresponds to P0.  But then the optimal 
policy correspondence G(p;δ < δc) gives us the optimal price in the next period, which is 
represented by point C and translates to price of P1.  This process continues until we reach the 
steady state price of pS.  Thus, for firms that do not value future period’s profits very highly, δ < 
δc, optimal prices fall and, hence AD duties rise over time until reaching a steady state 
equilibrium.  In contrast, the optimal policy correspondence function for firms that value the 
future relatively highly, δ > δc, crosses the 45° line at f0p , indicating that this price is the steady 
state equilibrium price.   
The optimal policy correspondence may not behave smoothly as illustrated in Figure 2b, 
but we can easily verify that the foreign firm will never reduce its dumping margin through the 
review process.12  The intuition is that if a foreign firm dumps in the initial period, this behavior 
reveals that the firm cares its current period profit loss associated with pricing higher than its 
static optimum relatively more than the gain in the future discounted profit from avoiding a 
positive AD duty in the next period. Then, in the next period with a positive AD duty, (A4) 
assures that the “current” profit loss associate with higher pricing gets steeper than before, 
inducing the firm to reduce its price even further or to set the same price.13  Thus, the fact that a 
foreign firm dumps in the initial period despite the dynamic costs from future AD duties, reveals 
the firm's dynamic preference toward dumping.  
Proposition 1 generates a specific empirical prediction: foreign firms will never try to 
reduce their AD duties through the administrative review process. Even a brief look at the U.S. 
                                                          
12 For the case where ∂2π(p;T)/∂p∂T > 0 instead of having (A4), it can be shown that G(p) is decreasing in p rather 
than increasing in p, using a similar argument as in Lemma 3.  This can lead to the dynamic pricing sequence 
through the administrative review process where AD duties under the review will move up and down, but eventually 
decrease to a lower value than the initial AD duty. This is theoretically an interesting phenomenon, but is not 
something we generally observe in our data for the U.S. AD cases from 1980 through 1995.     
13 Because (A4) is a crucial assumption for this result, it may be worthwhile to identify the conditions under which 
(A4) is satisfied, other than the curvatures of demand curves already mentioned in Footnote 9.  More specifically, 
one may try to relate (A4) with the price elasticity of demand, εp(p) = −(∂q(p)/∂p)⋅(p/q(p)). Using ∂εp(p)/∂p  has the 
sign same as that of  −[ (∂q(p)/∂p)(1+εp ) + p⋅(∂2q(p)/∂p2)], it is easy to show that (A4) will be satisfied as long as 
∂εp(p)/∂p > 0 and εp (>1) is close enough to 1. This result is not too surprising because ∂εp(p)/∂p >0 can be linked to 
 13 
AD administrative review data can tell us that this prediction is largely wrong; approximately 
45% of the initial dumping duties have been reduced through the review process during 1980-
1995 period. Thus, we next introduce uncertainty in the enforcement of AD policy into the 
model, which may induce the foreign firms to reduce their dumping duties through the review.          
 
3.2. Model with Uncertain Enforcement of AD Policy  
As mentioned earlier, many U.S. AD cases are not ruled affirmative and, hence, do not 
lead to AD duties.  This is despite the fact that the USDOC finds dumping in over 95% of the 
investigations!  About half the cases are ruled negative, almost exclusively because they do not 
meet the injury criteria of the USITC, and a significant amount lead to terminations, suspensions 
or withdrawn cases based on agreements between domestic and foreign firms, often VERs (e.g., 
see Prusa, 1992 and Anderson, 1992;1993). In addition, the AD investigation starts only after the 
domestic firms or the USDOC file an AD petition against potential dumping activities. Thus, it is 
obvious that there exist uncertainties in the outcomes and enforcement of AD policy, especially 
in the initial AD investigation.  From the foreign firm's point of view, this implies that setting 0p  
< f0p , does not necessarily incur T1 = 
f
0p /p0 > 1.  
To model the dynamic pricing problem in the presence of uncertain enforcement, we 
classify different contingencies of AD enforcement into the following three categories: cases 
with final affirmative dumping determinations (ADD), cases being ended with negative injury or 
dumping determinations (NEG) including the case of no AD petition filing, and cases being 
terminated, suspended, or withdrawn in lieu of some settlement, such as a VER (TER).  Note that 
from a foreign exporting firm's point of view, NEG cases will require no adjustment in its pricing 
behavior, but TER cases will require some adjustments which can either be favorable or 
unfavorable ones depending on the nature of settlements it can reach. 
In the presence of uncertainties in the enforcement of AD policy, a foreign firm's 
expectation on probabilities of different contingencies will play an important role in its initial 
pricing (dumping) decision and the following pricing decisions once it is subject to an AD duty.  
Given that a foreign firm dumps (pi < f0p ) in the absence of any current AD duty (Ti =1) at period 
i, let Pr(ADD), Pr(NEG), and Pr(TER)∈ [0, 1] denote the ex ante probabilities of getting an 
ADD, NEG, or TER case in the next (i+1) period, respectively. By definition, Pr(ADD) + 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
an increasing cost (consumers being more sensitive) for setting higher price as the price gets higher. However, 
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Pr(NEG) + Pr(TER) = 1.  Note that these are ex ante probabilities, so that, for example, a firm 
having a very low value for Pr(ADD) may find itself to be subject to an AD duty in the next 
period, despite its low expectation of such a duty. As discussed later, this kind of potential 
"shock" to expectations will generate an interesting pattern in dynamic pricing behaviors of firms 
subject to AD duties, which will be the basis of the empirical analysis.  
For analytical simplicity, we introduce the following assumptions on the nature of 
uncertainties surrounding the AD investigation.  First, once an AD duty is imposed, the initial 
AD duty and the following administrative reviews will be perfectly enforced, applying Ti+1 = 
f
0p /pi.  This fits with the observation that no injury determination by the USITC occurs during 
administrative reviews, which is the main source of uncertainty in the initial AD investigation.  
Second, once a TER case arises due to an agreement among interested parties, we assume such 
an agreement will be perfectly enforced, eliminating possibilities for any future AD 
investigation.  Finally, we assume that these ex ante probabilities, Pr(⋅)s are not functions of the 
price chosen in the absence an AD duty or an agreement, even though Pr(⋅)s may differ across 
different foreign firms belong to different industries.14  
Given the uncertain enforcement of AD policy described above, the discounted expected 
payoff in the initial period, EV( f0p ) will be given by: 
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increasing price elasticity w.r.t. p , is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for (A4).  
14 It is conceivable that pricing (dumping) behavior affects the USITC injury determination, which largely 
determines outcomes. However, given we assume that each individual firm is a small player in a monopolistically 
competitive industry (the implicit assumption behind the modeling in this paper), Pr(ADD) and Pr(TER) can be 
considered as exogenous variables from an individual firm’s point of view and mainly depend on the industry 
characteristics. 
 15 
where eip  represents the price to be set in period i when neither an ADD case nor a TER case has 
ever occurred until period i, { }...  ,p  ,p  ,p di2di1di0  denotes the price sequence from period i+1 in 
which an initial AD duty is imposed based on eip , and { }...  ,p  ,p  ,p ti2ti1ti0  denotes the price 
sequence from period i+1 in which a TER occurs with a specific value for eip .  Because the AD 
duty is determined by applying Ti+1 = f0p /pi, no previous periods' pricing but only 
e
ip  will matter 
in determining { }...  ,p  ,p  ,p di2di1di0 .  Given that a TER outcome occurs in the presence of a 
possible ADD case, once again only eip  (among all pervious periods' pricing) will play a role in 
determining { }...  ,p  ,p  ,p ti2ti1ti0 .15  
If neither an ADD nor a TER outcome has ever occurred, then the foreign firm will face 
the same problem as its initial problem regarding its choice of eip  for i = 1, 2, 3, … . Thus, the 
optimal price will be identical to the initial optimal price as long as the foreign firm has 
continued to have negative cases.  Denote this "initial" optimal choice to be E0p .  If a AD duty 
( D0T  = 
f
0p /
E
0p ) is ever-imposed for the first time, then the foreign firm faces the same certainty 
problem described in Section 3.1 from that period on.  Thus, we can use the same value function 
as in Section 3.1 to represent the discounted profit from that period on, V( E0p ): the solution to the 
problem in (3).  If a TER case occurs in period i+1, then E0p  will determine the following 
periods' pricing path, { }...  ,p  ,p  ,p ti2ti1ti0 , yielding the discounted profit from that period on, 
)p(q)cp()p(q)cp( ti1
ti
1
ti
0
ti
0 −δ+⋅− ⋅⋅⋅+−δ+ )p(q)cp( ti2ti22 .  Denote this discounted profit for a 
TER case by )p(V E0
T , using the fact that E0p  is a major variable that determines the pricing path 
for a TER case.  Then, we can rewrite the discounted expected payoff in the initial period as: 
 
                                                          
15 In determining the outcome of an agreement for a TER case, it is obvious that the level of eip  relative to 
f
0p  will 
play a crucial role, because a VER often assigns export licenses based on the pervious period market share of 
relevant firms and the possible bargaining for an agreement will take place with an AD duty being considered as a 
possible alternative to an agreement.  
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Because the ex ante probabilities, Pr(⋅)s are not functions of E0p , the dynamic pricing 
problem under uncertain enforcement is reduced to find out E0p  satisfying: 
  
(6) [ ]{ })p(V)TERPr()p(V)ADDPr()p(q)cp(Sup E0TE0E0E0
]f0p,c(
E
0p
⋅+⋅⋅δ+⋅−
∈
, 
 
and then the optimal pricing path under the administrative review process will follow G( E0p ) 
defined in (4) of Section 3.1.16  Therefore, to analyze the effect of introducing uncertain 
enforcement on the foreign firm’s dynamic pricing path under the administrative review process, 
we should first focus on how changes in Pr(ADD) and Pr(TER) affect E0p .  Proposition 2 
provides results on this issue.  
 
Proposition 2.  
i) E0p  is increasing in Pr(ADD),  
ii) E0p  is decreasing in Pr(TER) if )p(V
T  is strictly decreasing in p∈ (c, f0p ], and  
E
0p  is increasing in Pr(TER) if )p(V
T  is strictly increasing in p ∈ (c, f0p ].  
(See appendix for proof) 
 
It is easy to understand why an increase in Pr(ADD) will induce the foreign firm to 
choose a higher (at least not lower) value for its initial price ( E0p ).
17  Due to the same reason as 
                                                          
16 In the presence of a large value for Pr(TER) together with )p(V T  being strictly decreasing in p, we cannot 
eliminate the possibility of having E0p  < c. Because we have characterized G(p) and V(p) on p ∈ (c, f0p ] ,  we will 
focus on the case where E0p  > c.   
17 If V(p) is differentiable at E0p  = 
*E
0p , and 
*E
0p  is an interior solution that satisfies the first and the second order 
conditions for (6), then E0p  is strictly increasing in Pr(ADD) at 
E
0p  = 
*E
0p  in the sense that ∂ E0p /∂Pr(ADD) > 0. This 
can be easily shown by applying the envelope theorem to the f.o.c. for (6). However, V(p) is only shown to be 
 17 
under certain enforcement, the optimal price (in the absence of the AD duty) E0p  is set to balance 
the current period profit loss from setting the price higher than its static optimum against the 
future expected discounted profit gain from reducing the AD duty that the firm would incur once 
it becomes subject to a AD duty. A higher value for Pr(ADD) raises the cost for choosing a 
lower value for E0p , because it implies a higher probability of getting a costly (note that V(p) is 
strictly increasing in p) AD duty, reducing the incentive to set E0p  to be closer to its static 
optimum price, p*. 
The effect of an increased value for Pr(TER) on E0p  depends on whether )p(V
T  is strictly 
decreasing or increasing in p. If )p(VT  is strictly increasing in p, a higher value for Pr(TER) 
inflicts a higher cost for choosing a lower value for E0p  because a lower value for 
E
0p  will work 
as a disadvantage under a TER case.  If a lower value for E0p  works as an advantage under a TER 
case ( )p(VT  is strictly decreasing in p), then a higher value for Pr(TER) will provide an extra 
incentive to choose a lower value for E0p .  When an agreement under a TER case takes a form of 
VER where more export licenses are given to a firm with higher market share, like the one 
considered in Anderson (1992:1993), then a lower E0p  will work as an advantage under such an 
agreement.18  If a TER agreement is reached through a bargaining process between foreign and 
domestic firms with the ADD case as a threat point, however, it is possible to have a case where 
a lower E0p  works as a disadvantage for the foreign firm under a TER case. Therefore, which 
type of an agreement prevails under a TER case is an empirical question and will be analyzed in 
the following empirical section. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
differentiable almost everywhere, implying that there may exist a set (with measure zero) where V(p) fails to be 
differentiable. Even in that case, E0p  is non-decreasing in Pr(ADD). 
18 In this case, the maximization in (6) can be used to demonstrate a result (Proposition 1) of James E. Anderson 
(1993) that an increased enforcement (β) may intensify dumping behaviors for a sufficiently large probability of an 
AD VER (γ). Using that Pr(ADD) = β⋅(1-γ) and Pr(TER) = β⋅γ, (6) can be rewritten as  
 
(6’) [ ]{ })p(V)p(V)1()p(q)cp(Sup E0TE0E0E0
]f0p,c(
E
0p
⋅γ⋅β+⋅γ−⋅β⋅δ+⋅−
∈
.  
When γ is close to 1, then an increase in β will raise Pr(TER) without really affecting Pr(ADD), thus strengthening 
the incentive to dump (setting a lower E0p ) as )p(V
E
0
T  is strictly decreasing in E0p .    
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Given the analysis of effects of Pr(ADD) and Pr(TER) on E0p , we can now discuss the 
effect of uncertainties in the enforcement of AD policy on the dynamic pricing (AD duty) path 
under an administrative review process.  In contrast to the certain enforcement case where the 
AD duty can only increase (or stay the same) through the review process, the presence of 
uncertainty in enforcement generates the possibility for diminishing AD duties through the 
review process.  The following Corollary 1 demonstrates this.19  
 
Corollary 1.   Assume that there exists a unique stationary equilibrium under certain 
enforcement, denoted by pS.20   
i) If pS = f0p , there exists a Pr
c(ADD) ∈ (0,1] such that the foreign firm sets E0p  < f0p  for 
Pr(ADD) < Prc(ADD).  If an AD duty is imposed, with E0p  < 
f
0p  leading to AD duty 
E
0
f
0
d
0 p/pT = , then the foreign firm will choose it’s pricing path so that the AD duty 
decreases toward zero through the review process.  
ii) If [ ])p(q)cp(maxArg
P
−  < pS < f0p , there exists a Prc(ADD) ∈ (0,1] such that the foreign 
firm sets E0p  < p
S for Pr(ADD) < Prc(ADD).  If an AD duty is imposed, with E0p  < p
S leading 
to AD duty E0
f
0
d
0 p/pT = , then the foreign firm will choose it’s pricing path so that the AD 
duty decreases toward Sf0
S p/pT =  through the review process. 
(See appendix for proof) 
 
To help explain the above results, we present Figures 3a and 3b, which contain the policy 
correspondences, G(p), derived from computationally solving the dynamic programming 
(pricing) problem based on a linear demand.  Figure 3a illustrates the case where the discount 
factor is high enough so that the foreign firm would set 8ppp Sf00 ===  under certain 
enforcement.  Because E0p  decreases as Pr(ADD) decreases, 
E
0p  will become smaller than 8p
S =  
for a low enough value of Pr(ADD) as illustrated in Figure 3a.  Once a firm finds itself subject to 
a AD duty at period i, then it will adjust its pricing through the review as indicated by 
                                                          
19 Pr(ADD) = 1 for any E0p < f0p  implies certain enforcement. Thus, Pr(ADD) < 1 needs to be introduced to 
generate the possibility of diminishing AD duties under the review process.  One can generate a similar result with 
Pr(TER) > 0. 
20 Even for the case with multiple stationary equilibria under certain enforcement, the possibility of diminishing AD 
duties through the review process will emerge with the introduction of uncertainty into the enforcement of AD 
policy. However, the monotonic relationship between Pr(ADD) and the possibility of diminishing AD duties 
presented in Corollary 1 may fail to hold with the existence of multiple stationary equilibria. The existence of 
multiple stationary equilibria itself generates an interesting issue as it can create an unstable equilibrium where a 
small shock initiates a motion to a new equilibrium.  This paper, however, will focus on the case of a unique 
stationary equilibrium. 
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{ }...  ,p  ,p  ,p di2di1di0  in Figure 3a, until its price reaches to the stationary equilibrium 8pS = .  This 
implies that the corresponding sequence of AD duties will approach zero as claimed in Corollary 
1 (i). 
We can derive similar results to those for ADD in Corollary 1 for the dynamic path of 
AD duties for TER cases, which follow directly from Proposition 2 (ii).  In particular, dumping 
behavior may lead to better settlement terms for the foreign firm due to competition for export 
licenses under the settlement, as discussed by Anderson (1992;1993).  In this case, a high enough 
Pr(TER) exists such that the firm would price lower than it would under certain enforcement, and 
once it becomes subject to AD duties, this effect from the ex ante Pr(TER) would work toward 
reducing AD duties over time.   
Figure 3b presents an example of this case for specific functional forms.  In particular, 
Figure 3b depicts G(p) for the case where the discount factor is low enough to induce the foreign 
firm to dump even under certain enforcement, 8pp f00 =< .  In fact, the discount factor is low 
enough to make pS (= 4) below [ ] 6)p(q)cp(maxArg
P
=− , potentially disabling the possibility of 
having E0p  < p
S, because the lowest optimal value for E0p  will be [ ] 6)p(q)cp(maxArg
P
=−  (when 
Pr(ADD) = 0) if there is no other incentive to reduce the price below the static optimal price.  
However, a large value for Pr(TER) together with )p(VT  being strictly decreasing in p may 
generate an enough incentive for the foreign firm to cut its price below pS (= 4) in order to obtain 
more licenses to export under a possible VER.  If E0p  is set below p
S due to such a reason as in 
Figure 3b, then the pricing path through the review will follow { }...  ,p  ,p  ,p di2di1di0  indicated in 
Figure 3b. 
Another notable aspect of the numerical example in Figure 3b is that the stationary 
equilibrium price that the foreign will eventually choose under the AD enforcement, pS = 6, is 
lower than the price that it would choose in the absence of any AD policy, 
[ ] 6)p(q)cp(maxArg
P
=− .  This implies that the AD policy with lagged administrative review 
process may contribute to more aggressive dumping behavior rather than discouraging them.  Of 
course, the AD policy will have the intended impact on dumping behavior for the foreign firms 
that would not dump if they expect AD duties to follow with certainty, as shown in Proposition 
1.  For the firms that would dump even under the certain AD enforcement, however, the lagged 
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administrative process can induce those firms to dump more over time, having them dump more 
excessively than they would in the absence of AD policy.          
For most of our empirical work below, we relate percentage changes in the AD duty after 
the initial case to ex ante probabilities of the outcomes.  Denote the initial AD duty when a ADD 
case occurs by 0T  with 
E
0
f
00 p/pT =  and the stationary AD duty that will be reached at the end of 
the administrative review process by ST  with 
Sf
0S p/pT = .  Following from Proposition 2, then 
Corollary 2 relates the degree of changes in the AD duty, 00S T/)TT( −  = SSE0 p/)pp( − , to the ex 
ante probabilities, which become our testable hypotheses. 
 
Corollary 2. Given that there exists a unique stationary equilibrium under certain 
enforcement  
i) the increase in the dumping duty through the administrative review process,  
SSE
0 p/)pp( − , is increasing in Pr(ADD),     
ii) if )p(V T  is strictly decreasing in p∈ (c, f0p ], the increase in the dumping duty through 
the administrative review process, SSE0 p/)pp( − , is decreasing in Pr(TER), and  
iii) if )p(V T  is strictly increasing in p ∈ (c, f0p ], the increase in the dumping duty through 
the administrative review process, SSE0 p/)pp( − , is increasing in Pr(TER). 
(See appendix for proof) 
 
4. Empirical Methodology 
The previous theoretical section develops a dynamic pricing model for firms facing U.S. 
AD duties.  In this section, we use detailed data from U.S. AD investigations filed during the 
1980-1995 period to test the implications presented in Corollary 2; namely, that the increase in 
the AD duty is increasing in the ex ante probability of an ADD, and could be either decreasing or 
increasing in the ex ante probability of termination/VER.  
A direct test of these implications would use price data.  However, data on prices set by 
the foreign firm are unobservable.  Instead, data on AD duties and changes in these duties from 
administrative reviews allow us to track pricing decisions by the foreign firms over time in the 
following way.  As described in section 2, the assessed AD duty is the difference between the 
price of the product exported to the U.S. and some measure of “fair” or “normal” value for the 
product.  Thus, the initial AD duty can serve as a benchmark for the level of the U.S. price 
relative to this normal value.  Over time, administrative reviews of the dumping margin are 
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conducted and AD duties are recalculated.  The new dumping margin (and, hence, new AD duty) 
reflects changes in difference between the U.S. price of the product and the measure of normal 
value.  To the extent that these changes in AD duties over time reflect changes in the U.S. price 
only, they give a good measure of dynamic changes in U.S. prices after the case from which we 
can test implications of the previous theoretical section.  As discussed earlier, Gallaway et al. 
(1999) provides evidence that the majority of dumping margin changes stem from changes in the 
U.S. price, not measures of fair value.  On a final note, in the estimation analysis we control for 
observable instances where the USDOC alters its method of determining fair value. 
To examine our hypotheses, we need to relate these foreign firm price changes (reflected 
in dumping margin changes) to foreign firms’ ex ante expectations of an AD case outcome.  To 
accomplish this we employ a two-step estimation procedure.  In the first step, we estimate ex 
ante probabilities of case outcomes using data on U.S. AD petition filings and outcomes prior to 
the firm’s own case.  In the second step, we test whether these estimated ex ante probabilities 
affect the change in the AD duty (i.e., change in the firm’s U.S. price relative to normal value) 
that we observe after the case, controlling for other factors.  The next subsections provide more 
detail on each of these estimation steps. 
 
4.1. First-stage Estimation of Ex Ante Probabilities 
In the first stage, we estimate the ex ante probabilities of various AD case probabilities.  
These probabilities can be broken into two separate components: The probability that an industry 
will file an AD petition and the probabilities of various case outcomes conditional on an AD case 
petition.  For example, the probability that a foreign firm will be subject to an AD case that leads 
to AD duties in given year is the probability that the U.S. domestic industry will file a petition 
multiplied by the probability that the U.S. government will rule affirmative and assess AD 
duties. 
To estimate the unconditional probability of an AD petition filing, we sample all 4-digit 
SIC manufacturing industries and use a logit estimation procedure where the dependent variable 
is “1” if a petition is filed in an industry in a given year, and “0” otherwise.  Then, to estimate the 
probabilities of AD case outcomes conditional on a petition being filed, we sample the data from 
the AD cases we observe and use a multinomial logit specification where our dependent variable 
indicates three possible outcomes for an AD case: 1) affirmative decision with AD duties, 2) a 
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negative decision with no duties imposed, and 3) a termination, withdrawal, or suspension of the 
case due to a negotiated agreement between the domestic and foreign firms.21, 22   
To estimate ex ante probabilities, we use only the previous years in the sample for both 
sets of probability estimations (petition probability and case outcome probabilities).  For 
example, to estimate probabilities for 1986 U.S. AD cases in our sample, we use data for only 
the years from 1980 to 1985.  This assumes that firms do not use information prior to the 
beginning of our sample in 1980 to form expectations, which may be reasonable since a 
substantial U.S. AD law change occurred in 1979 that led to a drastic increase in U.S. AD 
petitions and success rates.  However, it also assumes that firms do not have better information 
than we do to form expectations.   
 
4.1.1. Petition Probability Estimation Regressors 
For each set of probabilities, we rely on previous literature to specify our explanatory 
variables.  A number of studies have estimated petition probabilities for U.S. manufacturing 
industries, including Finger (1981), Herander and Schwartz (1984), Feinberg and Hirsch (1989), 
Hansen (1990), Staiger and Wolak (1994), Krupp (1994), Lichtenberg and Tan (1994), and 
Furusawa and Prusa (1996).   From these studies, import penetration and industry employment 
(or size) are consistently the variables that explain cross-sectional petition probabilities.  The 
import penetration variables capture how the domestic industry is faring relative to import 
competitors, which should affect their incentives to file a petition and are criteria used by the 
USITC in determining injury.  The size variable indicates the importance of the industry to the 
U.S. economy which may affect the USITC’s willingness to grant trade protection.  Thus, we 
include the share of imports to domestic consumption and the square of this variable to control 
for import penetration, as well as employment for the 4-digit SIC industry. We lag these 
variables one year, as it may take some time for the industry to organize a petition.  In addition, 
the USITC would look at economic conditions up to three years prior to the petition in 
                                                          
21  Below we discuss sensitivity of results to alternative categorizations of AD case outcomes. 
22 An alternative procedure would be estimation of our ex ante probabilities through a nested logit specification.  
The advantage of a nested logit specification is that it would capture the possibility that the petition probabilities 
may not be independent of the case outcome probabilities.  However, a standard nested logit specification assumes a 
choice structure where characteristics of the alternative paths are the explanatory variables for a particular type of 
decision maker.  Our problem here is different in important ways.  First, there are different decision makers at each 
stage:  The domestic industry in the first stage petition decision and government agencies in the second stage case 
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determining the eventual outcome of the case.23  We expect import penetration to positively 
affect the probability of an AD petition, with the quadratic term potentially negative in sign, and 
employment to be positively related to petition probability.  Unlike previous studies, we also 
include a variable that indicates whether the industry has filed an AD petition previously.  We 
expect a positive relationship between this variable and petition probability, since familiarity 
with the AD petitioning process would presumably lower costs of future petitions.  There may be 
a number of time-invariant industry characteristics that would affect petition filings, such as 
those that would influence the ability of the industry to organize and jointly support an AD 
petition.  To control for these characteristics, we estimate a random effects specification of our 
logit model.  Finally, to control for macroeconomic shocks that may affect petition filing we 
follow Knetter and Prusa (2000) and include GDP growth and the exchange rate (a multilateral 
index of the U.S. exchange rate in terms of foreign currency per dollar).24  
 
4.1.2. AD Case Outcome Probability Estimation Regressors 
A number of empirical papers have examined the factors that determine the injury 
determination by the USITC which, in turn, largely determines whether a U.S. AD case will be 
ruled affirmative or negative.  These studies include Finger, Hall and Nelson (1982), Baldwin 
(1985), Moore (1992), DeVault (1993), and Hansen and Prusa (1996,1997).  Determinants of 
withdrawn/suspended cases are estimated by Zanardi (2000).  We draw on these studies for 
specifying our matrix of explanatory variables, Xij.   
First, the economic factors that determine the USITC injury decision play a large role 
whether the USITC rules affirmative in the case.  As with petition filing probability estimation, 
we include the share of imports to domestic consumption and the square of this variable to 
control for import penetration, and industry employment for the 4-digit SIC industry.  We expect 
greater import penetration and higher industry employment to increase the likelihood of 
affirmative and terminated/suspended outcomes. However, as Zanardi (2000) points out, AD 
cases are more likely to lead to settlements (rather than AD duties) when they involve products 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
outcome decision.  Second, our explanatory variables are case-specific and industry-specific, not path-specific.  In 
other words, they do not vary by the alternative (i.e., case outcome) that is “chosen”. 
23 Knetter and Prusa (2000) make this point as well.  They also lag these variables one year in their estimation of 
country-level AD petition filings and find no qualitative difference when they use three-year lags. 
24 A more general way of controlling for macroeconomic effects would be year dummies.  However, we found 
inclusion of these were marginally insignificant at standard confidence levels. 
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with substantial interest to the U.S. government.  This suggests that cases may more likely lead 
to settlements once the trade volume and/or employment size of the industry becomes 
substantial.   
One problem with using 4-digit SIC industry data is that it may not match very well the 
more narrowly defined products involved in AD cases.  We are able to gather information from 
the specific AD cases import volumes of the investigated product.  Thus, we include these import 
volumes and import volumes squared, expecting positive and negative coefficients, 
respectively.25 
Non-economic factors have been found to affect AD case outcomes in these studies as 
well.  Many studies have found that certain regions are more likely to receive certain outcomes 
than others. Studies on USITC decisions find that cases against EU countries are more likely to 
receive a negative outcome, while cases against Japan and non-market economies are more likely 
to receive affirmative outcomes.  Zanardi (2000) finds that EU and non-market countries are 
more likely to have settled cases.  We include region dummies for the EU, non-market countries, 
Japan, Asian NICs, and less-developed countries.   
Another common focus is whether steel and steel-related industries receive different 
outcomes, everything else, because so many U.S. AD cases cover these products and they were 
often high profile trade disputes.  The USITC studies often find these industries are more likely 
to receive affirmative decisions.  Also, a disproportionate number appear to end with 
settlements/VERs as well, though Zanardi (2000) does not find a statistically significant steel 
effect.  We include variables to capture industry effects for steel (SIC 3312, 3313, and 3315) and 
steel pipes and tubes (SIC 3317).26,27 Another industry control we include is the 4-firm 
concentration ratio. 
As with petition filing, past outcomes may correlate with current outcomes, including 
learning on the part of the petitioners and government agencies.  Thus, we include three separate 
dummy variables indicating whether a product has been involved in a previous affirmative U.S. 
                                                          
25 Import penetration for the investigated product, rather than simply import volumes, would obviously be a 
preferred variable.  However, domestic shipment data of the investigated product is often suppressed from USITC 
reports accompanying the AD case. 
26 There may be reasons to include year dummies in this estimation stage, but in a number of years there are only 
one or zero instances of a particular case outcome (particularly terminated/suspended) which leads to collinearity 
problems with including year dummies. 
27 With the exception of steel products, AD cases cover a wide variety of industries with often only a few cases in a 
particular industry, making it difficult to include systematic industry dummies. 
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AD outcome, a negative U.S. AD outcome, or a terminated/suspended U.S. AD outcome.  
Finally, we include GDP growth and exchange rates to control for macroeconomic conditions. 
 
4.2. Second-stage Estimation of Dumping Margin Changes 
In the second stage, the focus of our empirical analysis, we sample all firm and product 
combinations that were subject to an affirmative U.S. AD decision during our sample and 
examine whether changes in the dumping duties subsequent to the case are related to the ex ante 
unconditional AD case outcome probabilities estimated in the first stage.  As discussed, dumping 
margins change through administrative reviews, which can be initiated every year at the 
anniversary date of the initial AD orders.  Since these reviews can take a number of years to be 
completed in practice, we specify our dependent variable as the percentage change (in decimal 
form) in the AD duty four years subsequent to the case.  This time period is long enough so that 
firms that initiated administrative reviews had experienced at least one change in the AD duty 
since the time of the case.  A significant number of margins (83 or 15%) were reduced to zero 
during this time period, which means a lower bound of –1.  For this reason, we use a tobit 
specification truncated at –1.  As a sensitivity check, we also report results for a probit 
specification where the dependent variable indicates whether the dumping margin stays the same 
(or increases) after the case or not. 
Our main regressors are the estimated unconditional probabilities of an affirmative and 
terminated/suspended probabilities estimated in the first stage.  These are the conditional 
probabilities of affirmative and terminated/suspended probabilities multiplied by the probability 
of petition.  We exclude the unconditional probability of a negative decision to avoid perfect 
collinearity, as the three unconditional probabilities necessarily sum to one for each observation.  
Below we also discuss further controls in this regression that we add after first presenting results 
for this most basic regressor matrix. 
One significant concern with this specification is that the regressors are generated from 
previous regressions.  This can lead to biased standard errors, as shown by Pagan (1984).  Since 
there is no available formula for the covariance matrix when one introduces probabilities from a 
logit and multinomial logit estimations into a tobit equation, we use bootstrap methods to 
generate standard errors in this second stage estimation. 
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5. Data 
Our sample for the first stage estimates of the AD petition probabilities consists of data 
for all 4-digit SIC (1972-revision 2) U.S. manufacturing industries from 1980 and 1994.  Data on 
U.S. AD petitions and investigated tariff-line codes were collected from Federal Register notices 
and concorded to 4-digit SIC using the NBER Trade Database developed by Robert Feenstra.  
Imports from this same source were combined with 4-digit SIC level shipment data from the 
NBER Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database developed by Bartelsman, Becker and 
Gray, to construct the import penetration variables.  Industry employment data also come from 
this latter NBER database.  GDP growth and a trade-weighted multilateral index of the dollar (in 
terms of foreign currency per U.S. dollar) comes from the Economic Report of the President. 
Our sample for the first stage estimates of the AD case outcome probabilities consists of 
all U.S. AD manufacturing cases filed between 1980 and 1994.  Data on the cases and AD 
decisions were collected from Federal Register notices.  We define terminated/VER cases as 
only those where a VER or other formal settlement is publicly announced, and classify other 
withdrawn or terminated cases as negative outcomes.  Below, we present results when we 
categorize these cases in an alternative manner.  Thus, of the 715 case determinations for which 
we have observable data, 296 (41%) are categorized as affirmative, 338 (48%) are categorized as 
negative, and the remaining 81 (11%) are categorized as terminated/VER.  Industry data on 
import penetration and employment come from the same sources as indicated above.  Import 
volumes for the particular products involved in the case were taken from USITC reports and 
estimated when not available by collecting trade volumes of the subject tariff line codes from the 
NBER Trade Database.  Concentration ratio data at the 4-digit SIC level are for the year 1987 
and come from the Census of Manufactures. Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics for the 
variables we use in our first-stage estimations for the entire sample from 1980 through 1994 for 
both the logit estimates of petition probabilities and the multinomial regressions of AD case 
outcomes.28   
Our sample for the second stage estimates consists of all manufacturing firm-product 
combinations subject to U.S. affirmative AD decisions and AD duties for U.S. AD investigations 
filed between 1980 and 1995.  Much of the data were initially collected by James DeVault from 
Federal Register notices and USITC reports connected with each case (See DeVault, 1996, for 
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more details on data collection).  Information available from these data sources includes firm-
specific AD duties both at the time of the initial case, and in subsequent administrative reviews.  
As discussed, these AD duties are estimated dumping margins and reflect differences in the 
firm’s U.S. price and a definition of “normal” value, which is often the foreign firm’s price in its 
home market.  The evidence from our sample is that there is substantial variation in AD duty 
changes from administrative review.  Out of the 541 firm-specific initial AD duties in our 
sample, 254 (47.0%) were subsequently reviewed at least once.29  The average change in the AD 
duty after the first administrative review is from 41.3% to 31.4%, a sizeable decrease.  However, 
there were 34 cases (6.3%) where the AD duty increased after the first administrative review.  
 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1. First-stage Estimates of Ex Ante Probabilities 
In the first stage we perform both random effect logit estimations of the petition 
probability and multinomial logit estimates of the AD case outcomes.  For both sets of 
estimations, we estimate separate regressions for each year from 1982 through 1995 using the 
data from previous years back to 1980 in order to construct ex ante probabilities of AD case 
outcomes for our second stage.30  For the sake of space, table 2 and 3 present coefficient 
estimates from three of the thirteen subsamples in the estimations for petition and AD case 
outcome probabilities, respectively.  In other words, we present estimates used to construct ex 
ante probabilities for years 1985, 1990 and 1995, using subsamples 1980-1984, 1980-1989, and 
1980-1994, respectively.  For the multinomial logit estimations of AD case outcomes, we 
normalize the coefficient estimates for a negative AD outcome to be one, in order to identify and, 
hence, estimate the parameters of the model.  Thus, table 3 gives coefficient estimates for 
affirmative and terminated/VER outcomes, which are interpreted as effects relative to the 
negative outcome.  
Both sets of regressions in tables 2 and 3 show decent fit of the data even for the earlier 
1985 subsample we report, though a greater number of variables are correct sign and statistically 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
28 Many of the U.S. AD data used for this study can be found at the following webpage developed by Bruce 
Blonigen:  http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~bruceb/adpage.html. 
29 Two outliers were eliminated that involved very small initial AD margins with modest percentage point increases 
that translated into extremely large percentage increases.  Elimination of these two outliers does not affect our 
results qualitatively, but led to more reasonable coefficient magnitudes and increased the R2 measures by an order of 
magnitude. 
30  Reasonably estimated ex ante probabilities for 1981 were not possible because of insufficient sample size. 
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significant for later samples.31  For the sake of space, we do not describe the specific details of 
the coefficient estimates.  However, we note that the estimated probabilities seem quite 
reasonable.  For example, the average estimated ex ante probabilities of case outcomes almost 
exactly match the actual sample average probabilities.   
   
6.2. Second-stage Estimates – Testing Implications of Corollary 1 and 2 
Using the coefficient estimates from the first stage, we construct predicted ex ante 
probabilities of affirmative and terminated/VER AD outcomes to be used as regressors to test the 
implications of Corollary 1 and 2.  Obviously, the constructed probabilities are for only the 541 
firm-product combinations that became subject to affirmative AD decisions and, hence, AD 
duties.  Column 1 of table 4 reports estimates from tobit estimates where the dependent variable 
is the 4-year percentage change in the dumping margin after the case and the regressors are a 
constant and the predicted probabilities of affirmative and terminated/VER outcomes.  The chi-
squared statistic easily rejects the null hypothesis of jointly zero slopes at the 1 percent level.   
The coefficient on the ex ante probability of termination/VER is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level.  This empirical result corresponds with the case in Corollary 2 
where VT(p) is strictly decreasing in p; in other words, the case that is consistent with firm 
behavior when Anderson’s domino dumping scenario is relevant.  The coefficient magnitude in 
this case is likewise substantial.  At the means, a standard deviation increase in the ex ante 
termination/VER probability (13.7 percentage points) means an additional 37.7 percentage point 
decrease in the AD duty.  This is large, given an average 24.0% decline in the AD duty in our 
sample.  The incorrect and statistically insignificant coefficient on the ex ante probability of an 
affirmative outcome fails to confirm the first part of Corollary 2.  However, as we next show, 
this insignificant result is due to omitted variable bias. 
In particular, a potential concern with these estimates is that the USDOC often changes 
the way it measures normal value from the time of the case to subsequent administrative reviews.  
This could have a substantial effect on the dumping margin over time, even if the foreign firm 
did not alter its pricing policies and could seriously bias our estimates if it is not properly 
                                                          
31 As an alternative, we estimated our “ex ante” probabilities using the full sample for every observation, rather than 
only previous-year subsamples.  This might be warranted if firms early in the sample could anticipate petition 
probabilities and case outcome probabilities better than our model using only previous years.  However, when we 
use the full-sample estimates to construct ex ante probabilities we get qualitatively similar coefficient estimates in 
our second-stage regression analysis.  
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accounted for in our estimation.  The most substantial of these rule changes is when the USDOC 
uses “best information available” (BIA), because then the USDOC uses information supplied by 
the petitioners rather than the foreign firms.32  Specifically, we include a dummy variable when 
the original margin calculation was calculated using BIA at the time of the case, but not during 
the subsequent administrative review.  We also include a dummy variable for the reverse case, 
where BIA was not used at the time of the case, but then used for the administrative review.  A 
related concern is the USDOC’s handling of non-market economies where price data may not 
exist.  This allows the USDOC to use a variety of methods to estimate dumping margins.  In 
addition, firms from non-market economies may not be profit-maximizing which is an essential 
assumption of our theory.  Thus, we include a dummy variable indicating observations that 
involve non-market economies. 
A second concern is that from 1980-1984 administrative reviews occurred automatically 
each year at the anniversary of the case, whereas after 1984 these reviews occurred only if an 
interested party (a foreign or domestic firm involved in the case) requested a review.  This 
structural change in the law may also alter the dumping margin changes that we observe. We add 
a number of control variables to account for these administrative changes connected with 
USDOC dumping margin calculations.  To control for this we include a dummy variable for any 
cases that occurred when administrative reviews were automatic, rather than only initiated upon 
the request of an interested party. 
A final concern is that a number of cases were revoked within the four-year window on 
which we focus.  We record these as cases where the AD duty decreased 100 percent under the 
rationale that revocations occur because the foreign firm completely reduced its AD duty.  
However, revocations may occur for a variety of alternative reasons which may not be due to any 
change on the part of the foreign firm.  Thus, we include a dummy variable indicating cases 
which were revocations of the AD duties, not changes due to standard administrative reviews. 
Column 2 of table 4 presents results of our second stage estimates when we include these 
additional controls.  All five additional control variables are statistically significant at standard 
confidence levels and the pseudo R2 increases substantially.  The positive coefficient on the 
second control variable (“Change from no BIA to BIA”) is as expected, since the USDOC 
switching to information from the domestic petitioners to calculate dumping margins should lead 
                                                          
32 Another practice often used by USDOC is constructed cost measures to rule out foreign home prices (used to 
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to more adverse dumping duties.  By the same rationale, though, the coefficient on the first 
additional control (“Change from BIA to no BIA”) is expected to be negative, but is positive.  
We note, however, that the coefficient on this variable is much smaller and more imprecisely 
estimated than for the second control variable.  The coefficient on automatic administrative 
reviews is negative.  One possible explanation for this is that once administrative reviews were 
no longer automatic, foreign firms now had to incur substantial costs to request administrative 
reviews which led to less firms choosing to reduce dumping and receive a review.  Finally, our 
estimates suggest that non-market economies are less likely to have AD duties fall, while 
revocations lead to substantially larger decreases in the AD duty, as expected.  
Importantly, controlling for these additional variables leads to a statistically significant 
positive coefficient on the ex ante probability of an affirmative outcome, confirming our 
hypothesis in Corollary 2.  The coefficient estimate is also economically significant, as it 
suggests that a standard deviation in the ex ante probability of an affirmative outcome (7.2 
percentage points) implies only a 18.2% drop in the AD duty at the means, rather than the 
average 24.0% decline.  The ex ante probability of a terminated/VER outcome falls by about 
half, but continues to be statistically and economically significant. 
We also tried a number of alternative specifications to check the sensitivity of our results.  
First, in the initial specifications, we took a strict definition of terminated/VER cases, in the 
sense that we included only those cases where VERs or settlements were publicly announced.  
Any other withdrawn or terminated cases were treated as negative outcomes for our estimation of 
the ex ante probabilities.  However, as indicated by Prusa (1992), many withdrawn cases may be 
due to private settlements that yield similar outcomes for the involved firms.  Thus, as an 
alternative we categorized all such cases as terminated/VER cases, rather than negative 
outcomes. Tobit estimates using ex ante probabilities generated from this alternative 
categorization are shown in column 3 of table 4.  Results are qualitatively similar to those in 
column 2 of table 4, though the coefficient on the terminated/VER probability falls to less than 
one-quarter the magnitude in column 2 and is imprecisely estimated.  This change in definition 
leads to lower fit for the regression in general.  This may suggest that it is improper to include 
these withdrawn cases with no publicly announced settlements as ones where a public settlement 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
determine fair value) as below cost.   
 31 
was reached or, alternatively, private settlements may not elicit the same pricing behavior 
induced by “domino dumping” that our results suggest are occurring with public settlements.33 
To test the version of our hypotheses in Corollary 1 (and also as another sensitivity 
check), we substituted a dummy variable that takes the value of “1” if the AD duty does not 
decline (either increases or stay the same) after the AD case for our dependent variable and 
estimated the coefficients using a standard probit model.  These estimates are reported in column 
4 of table 4.  The coefficient on ex ante probability of an affirmative outcome is once again 
statistically and economically significant in this specification.  The coefficient estimate on ex 
ante probability of terminated/VER outcome suggests marginal economic effects in line with the 
tobit estimates, but is more imprecisely estimated with the probit specification.  However, we 
note our reported boot-strapped standard errors assume normality.  When we boot strap bias-
corrected confidence intervals, both the ex ante affirmative and terminated/VER probabilities are 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level in this probit specification. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks  
 
Our theoretical model under certain enforcement of AD trade policy can explain what are 
seemingly unreasonable behaviors of foreign firms subject to AD duties: Not all the foreign 
firms try to take advantage of the administrative review process by raising their export prices to 
lower AD duties.  For the firms that choose to dump in the initial period, despite AD duties in the 
following period, the presence of AD duties will make the inter-temporal tradeoff between the 
current and the future discounted profits more favorable to dumping behavior in the next period, 
yielding constant or higher AD duties through the review process. Introducing uncertain 
enforcement of AD trade policy into our model reveals incentives for the foreign firms to reduce 
their AD duties through the review process. Once a foreign firm is subject to AD duties the firm 
may adjust its prices so that AD duties fall over time in subsequent reviews, depending on its ex 
ante expectations and discount rate.  
The empirical results support the theoretical model with uncertain enforcement by 
showing that a lower ex ante probability of AD duties correlates with a greater reduction in AD 
duties in the administrative review after controlling for USDOC procedural idiosyncrasies.  The 
                                                          
33 Taylor (2001) finds no evidence that withdrawn cases lead to market outcomes that suggest private collusive 
settlements. 
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empirical results also find the first systematic empirical evidence of behavior consistent with 
Anderson’s (1992;1993) well-known domino dumping model.  In Anderson’s model, firms with 
ex ante expectations that an antidumping investigation will likely lead to a settlement dump more 
in anticipation of VER rents based on export market share.  Our model, in turn, shows that when 
such firms then receive AD duties instead of a settlement their increase in prices in subsequent 
periods to reduce those AD duties will be more substantial.   Our empirical results support this 
scenario by finding that a higher ex ante expectation of terminated/VER outcome substantially 
lowers AD duties in subsequent periods, all else equal.  
There are various ways to extend the current theoretical model, which could also lead to 
further empirical analysis. We can study how different types of uncertainties, like fluctuations in 
exchange rates or in product demands, affect firms' dynamic pricing under AD trade policy. We 
can also analyze how the vertical relationship between a foreign exporter and a domestic 
importer may affect the foreign firm's dynamic pricing path. These theoretical extensions may 
generate a new set of testable predictions on dynamic pricing of firms subject to AD duties. 
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Appendix 
Proof for Lemma 1.  
We can directly apply Theorem 4.6 in Stokey et al. (1989) to prove Lemma 1.  Denote 
the domain of the prices that the foreign firm can choose from by P, and let Γ: P → P be the 
correspondence describing the feasibility constraints, following Stokey et al.  Thus, for each p ∈ 
P, Γ(p) is the set of feasible values for the state variable in the next period if the current state is p.  
To apply Theorems 4.6, we need to show that  
i) P is a convex subset of R, and the correspondence Γ: P → P is nonempty, compact-valued, 
and continuous. 
ii) The function ( ))p(Tpq)cp( 1tttt −⋅⋅− : A → R is bounded and continuous, where A = { })p(p :PP)p,p( 1ttt1t −− Γ∈×∈ . 
 
(i) Without loss of generality, we can define P to be ]p,0[ .  This is because the effect of setting p 
> p  is identical to that of setting p = p : both actions will eliminate current period sales and 
reduce the next period AD duty to zero (T(p) =1) given p  ≥ f0p .  Then, Γ(p) is [0, p ] for all p ∈ 
[0, p ], satisfying (i). 
(ii) Because q(pc) = 0 when pc → ∞ and q(pc) is bounded, ( ))p(Tpq)cp( 1tttt −⋅⋅−  is also a 
bounded function in A.  Because multiplication of continuous functions generates a continuous 
function, ( ))p(Tpq)cp( 1tttt −⋅⋅−  is also a continuous function. 
   
 
Proof for Lemma 2. 
We can use a similar argument as in Theorem 4.7 of Stokey et al. (1989) to show that ( )1pV −  is a strictly increasing function on p-1 ∈ [c, f0p ).  To directly apply the theorem to lemma 
2, (i) Γ(p) ⊆ Γ(p') if p ≤ p' and (ii) ( ))p(Tpq)cp( 1tttt −⋅⋅− is a strictly increasing function in pt-1 
∈ [c, f0p ) for every pt ∈ [0, p ] need to be satisfied.  (i) is satisfied because Γ(p) ≡ Γ(p') ≡ [0, p ], 
but ( ))p(Tpq)cp( 1tttt −⋅⋅−  is not increasing in pt-1 when pt < c.  However, we can still show that 
V(p-1)  is a strictly increasing function as follows.  
Define the operator S on C(P), a space of bounded continuous functions f: P → R with 
the sup norm, by (Sf)(p-1) = ( ) ( )[ ])p(Tf)p(Tpq)cp(Max 1)p(p 1 ⋅δ+⋅− −Γ∈ − .  From lemma 1, we know 
that the operator S maps C(P) into itself, S: C(P) → C(P) and S has a unique fixed point V(p-1) ∈ 
C(P).  Define C'(P) to be a space of bounded, continuous, and non-decreasing functions g:P → R 
with the sup norm. C'(P) is a closed subset of C(P), thus if S(C') ⊆ C"(P), a space of bounded 
continuous and strictly increasing function, then V(p-1) ∈ C"(P) according to Corollary 1 to 
Theorem 3.2 (Contraction Mapping Theorem) in Stockey et al.  Thus, it remains to show that 
S(C') ⊆ C".  Because S(C') is already been shown to be bounded and continuous, we only need to 
show that (Sg)(p-1) = ( ) ( )[ ]pg)p(Tpq)cp(Max 1)p(p 1 ⋅δ+⋅⋅− −Γ∈ −  is strictly increasing in p-1 ∈ [c, f0p ).  
We can confine our attention to g(p) with g(p) = g( f0p ) for p ≥ f0p  w.l.o.g. because V(p) = V( f0p ) 
for p ≥ f0p  as T(p) =1 for all p ≥ f0p .  First, note that p will be chosen such that ( ) 0)p(Tpq 1 >⋅ − .  
Consider setting p = p' with ( ) 0)p(T'pq 1 =⋅ − .  Given (A3) and p-1 ∈ [c, f0p ], ( ) 0)p(T'pq 1 =⋅ −  
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implies that p' > f0p .  Because ( ) ( )f01f0f0 pg)p(Tpq)cp( ⋅δ+⋅⋅− −  > ( )'pg⋅δ , p = p' with ( ) 0)p(T'pq 1 =⋅ −  will not be chosen as p = f0p  is a strictly dominating choice.  Also note that p ≤ c 
will not be chosen.  Consider setting p = p' ≤ c, thus having ( ) 0)p(T'pq)c'p( 1 ≤⋅⋅− − .  Given (A4) 
and p-1 ∈ [c, f0p ], it is possible to set p = p" = c + ε with ε >0, so that ( ) 0)p(T"pq)c"p( 1 >⋅⋅− − .  
As p" > p' and g ∈ C', this implies that ( ) ( )"pg)p(T"pq)c"p( 1 ⋅δ+⋅⋅− −  > ( )+⋅⋅− − )p(T'pq)c'p( 1  ( )'pg⋅δ . Having established that p > c and ( ) 0)p(Tpq 1 >⋅ −  in solving (Sg)(p-1) 
= ( ) ( )[ ]pg)p(Tpq)cp(Max 1)p(p 1 ⋅δ+⋅⋅− −Γ∈ − , we can easily show that S(C') ⊆ C".  For p solving  
(Sg)(p-1), ( ) ( ) =∂⋅δ+⋅⋅−∂ −− 11 p/]pg)p(Tpq)cp[( ( ) )p/pp()p/)p(Tpq()cp( 21f0c1 −− ⋅⋅∂⋅∂⋅−−  > 0 
for p-1 ∈ [c, f0p ) because p > c and ( ) 0p/)p(Tpq c1 <∂⋅∂ −  with ( ) 0)p(Tpq 1 >⋅ − .  This implies 
that S(C') ⊆ C" for p-1 ∈ [c, f0p ). 
Now, we can narrow down the economically relevant domain and image of G(p) as 
follows.  First, it is easy to establish that we can focus on the optimal pricing path where pi  > c 
for i = 0, 1, 2, … w.l.o.g., if the foreign firm chooses its initial price 0p  in the absence of AD 
duties (T0 = 1).  As shown above, any p = p' ≤ c is strictly dominated by some p = p" > c in 
solving (Sg)(p-1) = ( ) ( )[ ]pg)p(Tpq)cp(Max 1)p(p 1 ⋅δ+⋅⋅− −Γ∈ −  when p-1 ≥ c, and the same is true when ( ) )p(Vpg = .  This implies that G(p) > c for p ≥ c, thus optimal pricing path will involve prices 
strictly greater than c.    
We show that the optimal pricing path involves prices equal or less than f0p  as follows.  
Note that we only need to consider the optimal pricing path with positive sales.  Consider the 
case where the firm chooses 0p  > 
f
0p  in the initial period.  This cannot be a part of optimal 
pricing path because setting /0p  = 
f
0p  will strictly raise the discounted payoff, (
/
0p  - c) ⋅q( /0p ) + 
V( /0p ) > ( 0p  - c) ⋅q( 0p ) + V( 0p ).  Because (A4) is a sufficient condition for 2×∂q(pc)/∂pc + (pc-
c)⋅ (∂2q(pc)/∂pc2) < 0 (the second order condition for static profit maximization with T=1) as long 
as  pc > c and q(pc) > 0, (A1) and (A4) together imply that q(pc) + (pc-c)⋅(∂q(pc)/∂pc) < 0 for pc ≥ 
f
0p  with q(p
c) > 0, which in turn implies ( 0p  - c) ⋅q( 0p ) < ( /0p  - c) ⋅q( /0p ). V( /0p ) = V( 0p ) 
because T1 =1 for both /0p  and 0p .  Now, consider that the firm chooses p1 > 
f
0p  with T1 ≤ f0p /c.  
This cannot be a part of optimal pricing path since setting p'1 = f0p  will strictly raise the 
discounted payoff, (p1' - c)⋅q(p1'⋅T1) + V(p1') > (p1 - c)⋅q(p1⋅T1) + V(p1).  (A4) implies that q(p⋅T1) 
+ (p-c)⋅T1⋅(∂q(p⋅T1)/∂pc) is a decreasing function in T1 with q(pc) + (pc-c)⋅ (∂q(pc)/∂pc) < 0 for pc 
≥ f0p  from (A1).  Thus, q(pT1) + (p-c)⋅T1⋅(∂q(p⋅T1)/∂pc) < 0 for p ≥ f0p , implying that (p1 - c) 
⋅q(p1⋅T1) < (p1' - c) ⋅q(p1'⋅T1). V(p1') = V(p1) because T2 =1 for both p'1 and p1.  For the next 
period on, we can apply the same logic that we use for period 1. 
 
 
Proof for Lemma 3  
First, note that p' in G(p') defines the current period AD duty by T' = f0p /p', since we can 
focus on p' ∈ (c, f0p ] due to Lemma 2 .  By definition of l(p'),  
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(a1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ]p ,c(p allfor   pV'Tpqcp)'p(lV'T)'p(lqc)'p(l f0∈δ+⋅⋅−≥δ+⋅⋅− . 
 
Consider p'' < p', thus T'' > T'.  Then, there exists α ≥ 0 such that (l(p') − c)⋅q(l(p') ⋅T'') + δV(l(p')) 
+ α = (l(p') − c)⋅q(l(p') ⋅T') + δV(l(p')) because ∂q(pc)/∂pc ≤ 0.  We can show that  
 
(a2)  (p − c)⋅q(p⋅T') + δV(p) > (p − c)⋅q(p⋅T'') + δV(p) + α for all p ∈ (l(p'), f0p ]  
 
Define A(p) = [(p − c)⋅q(p⋅T') + δ⋅V(p)] − [(p − c)⋅q(p⋅T'') + δV(p) + α].  By definition of α, 
A(l(p)) = 0 and ∂A(p)/∂p = [q(p⋅T') − q(p⋅T'')] + (p − c)⋅[ T'⋅(∂q(pT')/∂pc) - T''⋅(∂q(pT'')/∂pc)] > 0 
for p ∈ [l(p'), f0p ].  ∂A(p)/∂p > 0 because q(p⋅T)  + (p − c)⋅T⋅(∂q(p⋅T)/∂pc) is strictly decreasing 
in T by (A4): (∂q(pc)/∂pc)⋅p + (p − c)⋅[(∂q(pc)/∂pc) + (∂2q(pc)/∂pc2)⋅pc] < 0.  From (a1), (a2), and 
(l(p') − c)⋅ q(l(p') ⋅T'') + δV(l(p')) + α = (l(p') − c)⋅q(l(p') ⋅T') + δV(l(p')), we have (l(p') − c)⋅ 
q(l(p') ⋅T'') + δV(l(p')) > (p − c)q(pT'') + δV(p) for all p ∈ (l(p'), f0p ].  Thus, p ∉ G(p'') for p ∈ 
(l(p'), f0p ], implying h(p'') ≤ l(p') for p'' < p'.      
 
 
Proof for Proposition 1 
First, we can easily show that there exists a critical level of δ, denoted by δc, such that the 
foreign firm will dump in the initial period, p0 < f0p  if δ < δc and will not dump, p0 = f0p  if δ > δc.  
The foreign firm will not dump in the initial period if π( f0p ;T0 = 1) + δV( f0p ) > π(p;T0 =1) + 
δV(p), or equivalently π(p;T0 =1) − π( f0p ;T0 = 1) < δ[V( f0p ) − V(p)] for all p ∈ (c, f0p ).  Define a 
set ∆ ≡ {δ∈[0,1)
]f0p,c[p
Max
∈
{[π(p;T0) − π( f0p ;T0)] − δ[V( f0p ) − V(p)]} ≥ 0}.  Then, ∆ ∉ ∅ because 
there exists p' ∈ (c, f0p ) such that π(p';T0 =1) − π( f0p ;T0 = 1)  > 0 from (A1) and (A4).  Now, 
define δc ≡ Sup(∆), then the foreign firm will set p0 < f0p  if δ < δc.  If δc =1, then the foreign firm 
will dump for all δ∈(0,1). If δc < 1, the foreign will not dump in the initial period if δ > δc.   
To prove (ii), we can use the same argument as in Lemma 3.  With δ < δc, the foreign 
firm will set its initial optimal price, 0p  < 
f
0p , having  
 
(a3) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ]p ,c(p allfor   pVTpqcppVTpqcp f000000 ∈δ+⋅⋅−≥δ+⋅⋅− , 
 
where T0 = 1.  In the next period, the firm will try to choose p1 to maximize its discounted profit 
given that T1 = f0p / 0p  > 1.  Let's consider p1 = 0p  as such a choice, then there exists α ≥ 0 such 
that ( 0p  − c)⋅q( 0p  ⋅T1) + δV( 0p ) + α = ( 0p  − c)⋅q( 0p ⋅T0) + δV( 0p )  because ∂q(pc)/∂pc ≤ 0 and 
T1 > T0.  We can show that  
 
(a4)  (p − c)q(pT0) + δV(p) > (p − c)q(pT1) + δV(p) + α for all p ∈ ( 0p , f0p ]  
 
Define A(p) = [(p − c)q(pT0) + δV(p)] − [(p − c)q(pT1) + δV(p) + α].  By definition of α, A(p0) = 
0 and ∂A(p)/∂p = [q(pT0) − q(pT1)] + (p − c)[ T0(∂q(pT0)/∂pc) + T1(∂q(pT1)/∂pc)] > 0 for p ∈ [p0, 
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f
0p ] by the same reason as in Lemma 3.  From (a3), (a4), and ( 0p  − c)⋅ q( 0p  ⋅T1) + δV( 0p ) + α = 
( 0p  − c)⋅q( 0p  ⋅T0) + δV( 0p ), we have ( 0p  − c)⋅ q( 0p  ⋅T1) + δV( 0p ) > (p − c)q(pT1) + δV(p) for 
all p ∈ ( 0p , f0p ].  This implies p1 ∉ ( 0p , f0p ], thus p1 ≤ 0p .  If p1 < 0p , then we can repeat the 
same argument as above to show that p2 ≤ p1 by replacing T0 and T1 (>T0) with T1 and T2 (>T1).  
If p1 = 0p , then we can use the exactly same argument as above to show that p2 ≤ p1 = 0p . 
 
 
Proof for Proposition 2 
(i)  To prove E0p  is increasing in Pr(ADD), we use a similar argument as in Lemma 3.  Let's 
assume that the foreign firm sets its initial optimal price, E0p  for a given Pr(ADD), having  
 
(a5) 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ].p ,c(p allfor   )p(V)TERPr(pV)ADDPr(pqcp )p(V)TERPr(pV)ADDPr(pqcp f0T
E
0
TE
0
E
0
E
0
∈⋅+⋅⋅δ+⋅−
≥⋅+⋅⋅δ+⋅−
 
 
Now consider Pr'(ADD) > Pr(ADD), and the foreign firm tries to set its initial optimal price E0p ' 
for the given Pr'(ADD).  There exists α > 0 such that ( E0p  − c)⋅q( E0p ) + δ⋅Pr'(ADD)⋅V( E0p ) − α = 
( E0p  − c)⋅q( E0p ) + δ⋅Pr(ADD)⋅V( E0p ) because Pr'(ADD) > Pr(ADD).  We can show that  
 
(a6)  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ).p ,c(p allfor   ,)p(V)TERPr(pV)ADD(Pr'pqcp )p(V)TERPr(pV)ADDPr(pqcp E0T
T
∈α−⋅+⋅⋅δ+⋅−
>⋅+⋅⋅δ+⋅−
 
 
Define A(p) = [(p − c)⋅q(p) + δ⋅Pr(ADD)⋅V(p)] − [(p − c)⋅q(p) + δ⋅Pr'(ADD)⋅V(p) − α].  By 
definition of α, A( E0p ) = 0 and A(p) = [Pr(ADD)−Pr'(ADD)]⋅V(p) + α > 0 for p ∈ (c, E0p ) 
because V(p) is strictly increasing in p ∈ (c, ]pf0 .  From (a5), (a6), and ( E0p  − c)⋅q( E0p ) + 
δ⋅Pr'(ADD)⋅V( E0p ) − α = ( E0p  − c)⋅q( E0p )+ δ⋅Pr(ADD)⋅V( E0p ), we have ( E0p  − c)⋅q( E0p ) + 
δ⋅Pr'(ADD)⋅V( E0p ) > (p − c)⋅q(p) + δ⋅Pr'(ADD)⋅V(p) for all p ∈ (c, E0p ).  This implies E0p ' ≥ E0p  
for all Pr'(ADD) > Pr(ADD). 
 
(ii) We can use the same argument as in the proof for Proposition 2 (i), except using that 
there exists α > 0 such that ( E0p  − c)⋅q( E0p ) + δ⋅Pr'(TER)⋅V( E0p ) − α = ( E0p  − c)⋅q( E0p ) + 
δ⋅Pr(TER)⋅V( E0p ) and 
 
(a6')  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]   ,)p(V)TER(Pr'pV)ADDPr(pqcp )p(V)TERPr(pV)ADDPr(pqcp T
T
α−⋅+⋅⋅δ+⋅−
>⋅+⋅⋅δ+⋅−
 
 
for all p ]p,p( f0
E
0∈  if )p(VT  is strictly decreasing in p, or  for all p )p,c( E0∈  if )p(VT  is 
strictly increasing in p.  
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Proof for Corollary 1.  
(i) Define a set Α ≡ {Pr(ADD) ∈ [0,1]
]f0p,c[p
maxAug
∈
[(p − c)q(p) + Pr(ADD)⋅δ⋅V(p)] < f0p }.  
Then, Α ∉ ∅ because [ ] ∗
∈
≡− p)p(q)cp(maxArg
]p,c[p f0
< f0p  from (A1).  Now, define Pr
c(ADD) ≡ 
Sup(Α), then the foreign firm will set E0p  < f0p   if Pr(ADD) < Prc(ADD) because E0p  is increasing 
in Pr(ADD) from Proposition 2.  If an ADD case occurs with E0
f
0
di
1i p/pT =+  > 1 at period i, then 
the following pricing path { }...  ,p  ,p  ,p di2di1di0  under the administrative review will be determined 
by G( E0p ); note that the administrative review is enforced with certainty.  Because p
S is the 
unique stationary equilibrium under certain enforcement and G(p) is a non-decreasing upper-
hemi continuous correspondence, dijp  with j ≥ i+1 will increase toward pS = f0p .  This in turn 
implies that dijT  with j ≥ i+1 will decrease toward 1.  
 
(ii) For the foreign firm with pS < f0p , [ ] ∗∈ ≡− p)p(q)cp(maxArg ]p,c[p f0 < p
S is a necessary condition 
for the existence of Prc(ADD) ∈ [0,1] such that the foreign firm sets E0p  < pS  for Pr(ADD) < 
Prc(ADD).  Note that ∗= ppE0  when Pr(ADD) = 0 (and Pr(TER) = 0).  Because E0p  is increasing 
in Pr(ADD) as shown in Proposition 2, Spp ≥∗  will imply SE0 pp ≥  for all Pr(ADD) ∈ [0,1].  
Define a set Ω ≡ {Pr(ADD) ∈ [0,1]
]f0p,c[p
maxAug
∈
[(p − c)q(p) + Pr(ADD)⋅δ⋅V(p)] < pS}.  Then, Ω ∉ 
∅ because [ ] ∗
∈
≡− p)p(q)cp(maxArg
]p,c[p f0
< pS.  Now, define Prc(ADD) ≡ Sup(Ω), then the foreign 
firm will set E0p  < p
S if Pr(ADD) < Prc(ADD) because E0p  is increasing in Pr(ADD) from 
Proposition 2.  If an ADD case occurs with Sf0
E
0
f
0
di
1i p/pp/pT >=+  at period i, then the following 
pricing path { }...  ,p  ,p  ,p di2di1di0  under the administrative review will be determined by G( E0p ).  
Because pS (> E0p ) is the unique stationary equilibrium under certain enforcement and G(p) is an 
increasing upper-hemi continuous correspondence, dijp  with j ≥ i+1 will increase toward pS.  This 
implies that dijT  with j ≥ i+1 will decrease toward Sf0 p/p .  
 
 
Proof for Corollary 2. 
First, note that the stationary equilibrium price under the administrative review process, pS is not 
affected by Pr(ADD) and Pr(TER).  Therefore, Pr(ADD) and Pr(TER) affect the increase in the 
dumping duty through the administrative review process, SSE0 p/)pp( − , only through changing 
the initial price choice, E0p .  Then, Corollary 2 (i), (ii) and (iii) are direct results from 
corresponding results in Proposition 2. 
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Figure 3a. (q(p)=10-p, c = 2, pf = 8, δ = 0.9) 
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Figure 3b. (q(p)=10-p, c = 2, pf = 8, δ = 0.5)  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Entire First-stage Sample of Variables, 1980-1994. 
 
Variables 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Random-effects logit estimates of petition 
probabilities 
 
Dependent variable: “1”= petition, 
“0”=no petition 
 
 
 
 
0.038 
 
 
 
 
0.190 
 
 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
 
 
1.000 
 
Independent Variables: 
Import penetration share lagged. 
 
 
13.484 
 
 
15.669 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
95.801 
Import penetration share lagged and 
squared. 
 
427.29 
 
1017.78 
 
0.000 
 
9177.87 
Industry employment lagged. (in 000s) 40.105 61.544 0.000 694.000 
Real GDP growth rate 2.747 2.197 -2.023 7.263 
Exchange rate index (1981=100) 94.805 13.072 81.500 121.100 
Previous AD petitions. 0.150 0.357 0.000 1.000 
 
 
Multinomial logit estimates of case 
outcomes 
 
Dependent variable: “1”= affirmative, 
“2”=negative, “3”=terminated/VER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.699 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.661 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.000 
 
Independent Variables: 
Import penetration share lagged. 
 
 
15.076 
 
 
8.806 
 
 
1.027 
 
 
66.494 
Import penetration share lagged and  
squared. 
 
304.71 
 
462.64 
 
1.055 
 
4421.48 
Industry employment lagged. (in 000s) 117.71 128.69 1.300 632.400 
Real GDP growth rate 2.683 2.310 -2.023 7.263 
Exchange rate index (1981=100) 96.271 14.606 81.500 121.100 
Import value of investigated product. 33826 83351 0.000 859800 
Import value of investigated product 
squared. 
 
8.08E+09 
 
4.82E+10 
 
0.000 
 
7.39E+11 
Previous affirmative decision. 0.217 0.412 0.000 1.000 
Previous negative decision. 0.298 0.458 0.000 1.000 
Previous terminated/VER decision. 0.165 0.371 0.000 1.000 
4-firm concentration ratio. 37.538 16.212 9.000 100.000 
Iron and steel products. 0.366 0.442 0.000 1.000 
Steel pipe products. 0.083 0.275 0.000 1.000 
Non-market economy. 0.108 0.310 0.000 1.000 
Less-developed country. 0.499 0.500 0.000 1.000 
European union. 0.288 0.453 0.000 1.000 
Japan. 0.122 0.327 0.000 1.000 
Asian NICs. 0.158 0.365 0.000 1.000 
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Table 2: Random-effects logit estimation of first-stage determinants of U.S. AD petition 
probability. 
Dependent Variable:   “1” if petition; “0” otherwise.   
 
 
Explanatory Variables 
 
Estimation for 
1985 (using 1980-
1984 data)  
Estimation for 
1990 (using 1980-
1989 data) 
Estimation for 
1995 (using 1980-
1994 data) 
 
Import penetration share lagged. 
 
     
       0.052* 
      (0.031) 
 
     
       0.073*** 
      (0.023) 
 
     
       0.093*** 
      (0.022) 
 
Import penetration lagged and squared.      - 0.001 
      (0.001) 
 
     - 0.001*** 
     (0.0005) 
 
     - 0.002*** 
     (0.0005) 
 
Industry employment lagged.  0.005*** 
     (0.001) 
 
 0.005*** 
     (0.001) 
 
 0.005*** 
     (0.001) 
 
Real GDP growth rate 
 
 
    - 0.040 
     (0.047) 
 
    - 0.065* 
     (0.036) 
 
    - 0.061* 
     (0.033) 
 
Exchange rate index (1981=100) 
 
       - 0.014  
     (0.017) 
 
      0.017** 
     (0.007) 
 
 0.022*** 
     (0.006) 
 
Previous AD petitions 
 
 
         2.506*** 
        (0.285) 
         1.653*** 
        (0.305) 
         1.105*** 
        (0.294) 
Chi-squared statistic      129.99***      109.85***        86.73*** 
Number of observations           2159           4324            6471 
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses, with ***, ** and * denoting statistical significance 
(two-tailed test) at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
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Table 3: Multinomial logit estimation of first-stage determinants of U.S. AD case outcome 
probabilities. 
Dependent Variable:  
“1” if affirmative; “2” if negative; “3” if terminated/VER. 
 
 
 
Explanatory Variables 
 
Estimation for 
1985 (using 1980-
1984 data)  
Estimation for 
1990 (using 1980-
1989 data) 
Estimation for 
1995 (using 1980-
1994 data) 
Determinants of affirmative outcomes 
 
Industry import penetration share 
lagged. 
 
 
     - 0.089 
      (0.064) 
 
 
     - 0.060 
      (0.041) 
 
 
     - 0.087** 
      (0.030) 
Industry import penetration lagged and 
squared. 
       0.002 
      (0.001) 
       0.001 
      (0.001) 
       0.002*** 
      (0.001) 
Industry employment lagged.        0.001 
      (0.002) 
       0.002 
      (0.002) 
      0.0002 
      (0.001) 
Real GDP growth rate 
 
       0.051 
      (0.078) 
       0.050 
      (0.055) 
       0.119*** 
      (0.045) 
Exchange rate index (1981=100) 
 
      0.0003 
         (0.030) 
     - 0.005 
         (0.011) 
     - 0.014* 
         (0.007) 
Import value of investigated product   - 6.30e-07 
   (9.46e-06) 
    4.44e-06 
   (4.11e-06) 
    6.13e-06** 
   (2.83e-06) 
Import value of investigated product 
squared 
    2.57e-12 
   (3.68e-11) 
  - 5.30e-12 
   (7.37e-12) 
  - 7.71e-12* 
   (4.59e-12) 
Previous affirmative decision in 
investigated product 
  - 1.127 
 (1.379) 
    1.848*** 
 (0.520) 
    0.820*** 
 (0.313) 
Previous negative decision in 
investigated product 
  - 0.097 
 (0.802) 
  - 0.037 
 (0.404) 
  - 0.638** 
 (0.292) 
Previous terminated/suspended decision 
in investigated product 
  - 0.509 
 (1.083) 
  - 1.536** 
 (0.612) 
  - 1.021*** 
 (0.385) 
Industry 4-firm concentration ratio         - 0.024 
(0.014) 
        - 0.011 
(0.007) 
        - 0.009 
 (0.006) 
Iron and steel products. 0.702 
(0.944) 
        - 0.356 
(0.626) 
          0.578 
(0.379) 
Steel pipe products 
 
        1.001 
      (0.899) 
        0.428 
      (0.528) 
       1.139*** 
      (0.397) 
Non-market economy 
 
        0.595 
         (0.925) 
        0.722 
         (0.550) 
        0.886** 
         (0.357) 
Less-developed country 
 
        1.464* 
         (0.768) 
        0.676 
         (0.429) 
        0.625* 
         (0.323) 
European union 
 
        0.551 
         (0.648) 
        0.003 
         (0.394) 
        0.254 
         (0.314) 
Japan 
 
        1.952** 
         (0.765) 
        0.981** 
         (0.471) 
        1.088*** 
         (0.378) 
Asian NICs 
 
 
     - 0.825 
         (0.787) 
      - 0.305 
         (0.399) 
      - 0.180 
         (0.285) 
Determinants of terminated outcomes 
 
Industry import penetration share 
lagged. 
 
 
       1.708*** 
      (0.522) 
 
 
     - 0.058 
      (0.088) 
 
 
       0.093* 
      (0.056) 
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Industry import penetration lagged and 
squared. 
     - 0.081*** 
      (0.023) 
      0.0003 
      (0.003) 
     - 0.002 
      (0.001) 
Industry employment lagged. 
 
     - 0.005 
      (0.004) 
       0.006*** 
      (0.002) 
       0.005*** 
      (0.001) 
Real GDP growth rate 
 
       0.091 
      (0.103) 
        0.153** 
      (0.070) 
       0.127** 
      (0.057) 
Exchange rate index (1981=100) 
 
     - 0.003 
         (0.047) 
        0.030* 
         (0.017) 
       0.035*** 
         (0.009) 
Import value of investigated product     4.27e-05*** 
   (1.23e-05) 
    1.55e-05*** 
   (5.37e-06) 
    9.12e-06** 
   (3.63e-06) 
Import value of investigated product 
squared 
  - 6.56e-11** 
   (3.17e-11) 
  - 2.05e-11* 
   (1.07e-11) 
  - 1.07e-11* 
   (6.30e-12) 
Previous affirmative decision in 
investigated product 
    1.656 
 (1.149) 
    2.196*** 
 (0.571) 
    0.851** 
 (0.393) 
Previous negative decision in 
investigated product 
    0.180 
 (0.759) 
  - 0.559 
 (0.493) 
  - 0.538 
 (0.371) 
Previous terminated/suspended decision 
in investigated product 
  - 0.246 
 (0.914) 
  - 0.590 
 (0.532) 
  - 0.794* 
 (0.427) 
Industry 4-firm concentration ratio          - 0.043 
 (0.027) 
         - 0.033** 
 (0.016) 
         - 0.017* 
 (0.010) 
Iron and steel products. 
 
      3.895*** 
(1.385) 
   1.369* 
(0.710) 
0.555 
(0.442) 
Steel pipe products 
 
        1.673 
      (1.132) 
        1.521** 
      (0.658) 
        0.682 
      (0.513) 
Non-market economy 
 
        2.215** 
         (1.128) 
        1.149* 
         (0.618) 
        0.774* 
         (0.436) 
Less-developed country 
 
        0.552 
         (0.952) 
        1.057** 
         (0.531) 
        1.181*** 
         (0.427) 
European union 
 
        0.732 
         (0.796) 
        0.933* 
         (0.507) 
        1.043** 
         (0.412) 
Japan 
 
        0.170 
         (1.119) 
        0.540 
         (0.727) 
        0.149 
         (0.610) 
Asian NICs 
 
     - 3.042** 
         (1.353) 
     - 1.473** 
         (0.640) 
      - 1.019** 
         (0.437) 
 
Chi-squared statistic   151.88***   218.48***   229.40*** 
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.23 0.15 
Number of observations  214  448  715 
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses, with ***, ** and * denoting statistical significance 
(two-tailed test) at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.   
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Table 4: Estimation of second-stage determinants of AD margin changes after affirmative 
AD outcome. 
Tobit 
Estimation 
Probit 
Estimation 
 
 
Regressors  
No Controls 
 
Controls 
Broader 
Definition of 
Term/Susp. 
 
Controls 
 
Focus Variables 
 
Ex ante probability of 
AFFIRMATIVE outcome. 
         
      
 
     - 0.642        
      (0.494)        
            
 
 
      0.802**  
     (0.409)         
            
 
 
      0.716**  
     (0.340)         
 
 
 
       2.799*** 
      (0.901)   
 
Ex ante probability of 
TERMINATION/VER 
outcome. 
 
 
     - 3.282***   
      (0.901)        
 
    - 1.716*        
     (0.934)         
 
    - 0.406        
     (0.679)         
 
     - 2.799        
      (3.301)        
 
Controls for DOC 
methodology: 
Change from BIA to no 
BIA. 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
      
      0.108*      
     (0.060)         
  
 
 
      
      0.116*      
     (0.060)         
  
           
  
 
      0.627*** 
     (0.137)         
 
Change from no BIA to 
BIA. 
 
  
      1.244***    
     (0.127)         
  
 
    1.263***    
     (0.128)         
  
 
      1.314*** 
     (0.402) 
Period of automatic 
administrative reviews. 
  
  
  
    - 0.481*** 
     (0.091)  
    - 0.547*** 
     (0.093)   
   - 0.819***     
    (0.198)    
Non-market economy.   
  
  
      0.138* 
     (0.080)  
      0.137 
     (0.080)   
     0.831***     
    (0.207)    
Revocation of AD duty.   
  
  
    - 1.047*** 
     (0.162)  
    - 1.107*** 
     (0.157)   
   - 1.325***     
    (0.306)    
 
 
Chi-squared statistic.      64.59***    260.12***   249.92***    152.97***   
Pseudo R2.         0.05          0.22   0.21           0.21 
Number of observations.          541           541             541     541 
NOTES: Dependent variable for tobit estimation is the 4-year percentage change in the AD duty, 
while the dependent variable for the probit estimation a dummy variable that takes the value of 
“1” if AD duty does not decrease.  Robust standard errors for all variables except the ex ante 
probabilities, for which the standard errors are bootstrapped.  ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance (two-tailed test) at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.   
